The Ethical Challenge in Post-structuralism and the Buddhist Middle Way Post-structuralism, the Middle Way, and Their Inherent Flaw

The Ethical Challenge in Post-structuralism and the Buddhist Middle Way Post-structuralism, the Middle Way, and Their Inherent Flaw When one tries to explain modern philosophy and Mahayana Buddhism—which share the same essence—in a simple way, there's a bit of a sleight of hand from a purely philosophical perspective. This intellectual fudge might be why modern philosophy is often called "modern thought" instead of philosophy, and why Buddhism is considered a religion rather than a philosophy. To put it simply, while philosophy could content itself with addressing fundamental questions of ontology and epistemology, the relativism of post-structuralism and the Buddhist concepts of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka) and the Middle Path go a step further: they seem to recommend a certain way of life. In other words, they delve into ethics and morality. They have a vibe of, "You'd be better off living, thinking, and acting this way." Frankly, this is unsolicited advice. Anyone who has studied Kant might remember being deeply moved by the Critique of Pure Reason but feeling unconvinced by the Critique of Practical Reason or the Critique of Judgment. The Critique of Practical Reason deals with morality and ethics. To speak bluntly, it’s a book about what "ought to be," which to a modern reader can feel like an unnecessary, superfluous add-on to Kant's work. We live in a post-religious age, having undergone the baptisms of both Nietzsche and Sartre, in a world of nihilism where we are "condemned to be free." Many of us may feel we don't need the nagging sermons of a meddlesome mother, groundlessly telling us what to do and thus shackling the freedom we worked so hard to attain. While terms like "nihilism" and "condemned to be free" might have negative connotations, let's assume for a moment that freedom is a good thing. Having finally achieved it, the idea of restricting it feels unpleasant. The relativism of post-structuralism and the Buddhist Middle Way can feel like they are imposing just such a preachy burden. The 20th Century's Greatest Invention The greatest invention of the 20th century—though it may have existed in the late 19th century, and Buddhism said the same thing 2,600 years ago—is freedom and structuralism. It may be a contradiction in terms to name two things as the "greatest invention," but let's not sweat the details. Freedom can be seen as the path forged by Nietzsche, Sartre, and other philosophers. Structuralism was born in mathematics but emerged simultaneously in linguistics and other fields, spreading explosively in the mid-20th century. The foundation of modern society is structuralism. While both realism and structuralism can lead to unnatural and counter-intuitive phenomena, structuralism is better suited for system-building. It is the foundation of every academic discipline. And as we watch computers, AI, the internet, and social media develop explosively and spread universally throughout society, it's hard not to feel humbled, to realize that anthropocentrism is over in a practical sense, and that we must stop overestimating ourselves. All of these—computers, AI, the internet, social media—are the offspring of structuralism. Structuralism is Revolutionary; Post-structuralism, Not So Much Structuralism is a revolutionary idea. Though structuralist-like thoughts have existed in every era, it was modern mathematics that first purely extracted it. (In truth, the Buddha or Nāgārjuna came first, but we'll set that aside for now.) Pure structuralism is a disruptive innovation. Its practicality is on another level. Philosophically, it can serve as a complete alternative to realism in epistemology and ontology. Scientifically, it can be the foundation of all academic disciplines. Its industrial and economic foundation is evident in the current frenzy of AI investment—it's easy to see what an incredible future awaits. Its practicality is so immense that it has become the bedrock of modern society. But beyond its utility, it can philosophically serve as a complete foundational theory for epistemology and ontology, replacing realism. On the other hand, the relativism of post-structuralism and the Buddhist Madhyamaka/Middle Way are kind of like saying, "Hey, both realism and structuralism can be valid and coexist, so let's all just get along." That both can be independently valid might be the discovery of post-structuralism, but one could also say it's not a very significant discovery. It's a rather small finding; perhaps it wasn't even a discovery at all, but something sharp minds knew from the start. This is where post-structuralism gets fuzzy. There's no debate about who discovered or invented post-structuralism. The same is true for Buddhism. The Buddha was deeply moved when he discovered Dependent Origination (Pratītyasamutpāda), thinking it was enlightenment itself, the truth. But regarding the Middle Way, there seem to be no records of a particular discovery,感動, or episode. This might be why Buddhism is often misunderstood as a philosophy of Emptiness (Śūnyatā) rather than a philosophy of the Middle Way. Nāgārjuna, in contrast, is more strategic. He places Madhyamaka (the Middle View) at the center. Emptiness remains important, but he warns against attachment to it, calling it kūshū (attachment to emptiness). Nāgārjuna says, "Emptiness is merely a medicine." It's a medicine to cure those who can only understand and cling to realism. The framework is that once the illness of clinging to realism is cured with the medicine of Emptiness, the true goal is Madhyamaka. In that sense, the Western post-structuralists, who left behind only a fuzzy version of this Middle View, are inferior as thinkers to Nāgārjuna. At the same time, one could also see them as superior to Nāgārjuna for having deliberately left this point ambiguous. However, it's probably better to think of Nāgārjuna not as an individual but as a representative of the people around him and the intellectual climate of his time. Madhyamaka and Relativism are Amazing, But… To put Madhyamaka and relativism in a single phrase from today’s lexicon, it would be DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion). Not for people in society, but for the ideas within an individual's mind. It's the idea of "respecting the diversity of various thoughts, treating them equally, and incorporating them." However, while that may be fine for people, ideas don't necessarily need to be treated as equals. There should be room for various opinions like, "I don't like this idea, so I won't adopt it," or "I'm going with this single ideology, so others are a lower priority." In fact, that approach, while perhaps not DEI, allows us to protect the crucial value of "freedom." Post-structuralism and the Middle Way are Metacognition Post-structuralism and the Middle Way are ideas that tell us to possess metacognition. When you adopt relativism instead of absolutism, metacognition is automatically extracted and appears naturally. Metacognition is "cognizing cognition." It's the awareness that, "I am thinking and acting according to this particular ideology." It is to recognize that "there is a whole, there are others (not necessarily people), there is myself, and there is an outside." Based on that premise, you can absolutize something, or you can relativize both others and yourself. Having metacognition is not necessarily a good thing. There are cases where you'd be better off not knowing. In Zen, there's a saying, "Be the master wherever you are," but there's also the phrase, "the comfort of a slave." There are many cases where one can live more happily without metacognition or a sense of self-awareness. Like Japan during the Edo period or Bhutan, a closed country might lead to a higher level of happiness for its citizens. Moreover, there are cases where one simply cannot have metacognition. An obvious example is individuals with severe or moderate intellectual disabilities, who may not have the cognitive capacity for it. Also, certain mental illnesses, like schizophrenia, involve impaired metacognition. Clinically, this is sometimes referred to as a "lack of insight." It's a state where one "cannot grasp from an objective viewpoint that one is saying or doing strange things." Conversely, one could say that "because there is no (or diminished) metacognition, because one cannot see oneself objectively, one says or does strange things to others." This is not to say that severe intellectual disability or certain mental illnesses are bad; they are just another way of being human. In fact, modern philosophy has aspects that were born from psychopathology and psychoanalysis. From a psychopathological perspective, a "lack of insight" is not a bad thing; it can be a "good thing that stabilizes symptoms or the condition," or it can even "work towards healing the disease." Conversely, there's a phenomenon called "late remission," where insight is gained or symptoms lighten in later life. In the past, it was said that one had to be careful about suicide in such cases. In any case, metacognition is tiring. It's not suited for constant operation. Normal people have various modes of thought and personas, and they switch between them automatically depending on the situation. For ordinary people, memory connects everything, so there's no problem, but in dissociative disorders where memory is impaired, it can manifest as multiple personalities. It's often easier to have these modes switch automatically rather than having to return to a main screen to select one. Nietzsche and Heidegger criticized living this way without much self-awareness as being part of "the herd" or "falling," but living conformistly without individuality has its easy-going merits compared to a life that only pushes for originality. Post-structuralism and the Middle Way are Only about Application Both post-structuralism and Madhyamaka/the Middle Way are certain ways of knowing, but they don't use a new epistemology. They are merely policies for how to build and operate systems using realism or structuralism; they don't create anything revolutionary. For simple relativism, you don't even need complicated philosophical debates about structuralism or realism. Many people probably practice it naturally without being taught. Anyone who knows Galileo's or Newton's concepts of relativity in physics can quickly understand what relativism is by analogy. After all, the relativistic model of post-structuralism and the Middle Way/Madhyamaka can be constructed upon either realism or structuralism, so they are, in a sense, mere applications. On top of that, inserting a moralistic "you should do this," like in DEI, is questionable. The problem with morality is that it's a kind of groundless imposition. Ultimately, regardless of epistemology or ontology, regardless of post-structuralist relativism or Madhyamaka, we must think, judge, decide, and act in each moment. Sometimes, we have to take responsibility for the consequences of our actions—or, as they say in the Kansai dialect, "wipe our own ass." Nietzsche's practical morality would be to be an Übermensch; Sartre himself chose the life of a communist activist within freedom. Even if we don't choose, we have to think or act every day. Even if we are not autonomous, even if we are just going with the flow or conforming without individuality, we are doing something at every moment. It might be purer for philosophy to remain in the realm of pure reason and not speak of practical reason (morality and ethics) or judgment (values). In the world of freedom opened up by Nietzsche and other great predecessors, ethics and morality—no matter what they are, whether directed at oneself or others—are a kind of imposition. And since Nietzsche, morality and ethics are arbitrary. To impose something arbitrary or convenient for someone else upon oneself or others is, if not a sacrilege against autonomy and self-awareness, at least a lack of respect. Conclusion: Humans are Free Humans are free. Therefore, you do not need to adopt the relativism of post-structuralism or the Buddhist Middle Way. Depending on your perspective—or perhaps regardless of it—they are an imposing ethical and moral theory. You don't need them, but it's useful to know about them. They are incredibly convenient, so I recommend understanding them as just one way of thinking and then using them as needed.