You Can Choose Secular Ideologies Freely, but There Is a Prerequisite: A "Conversation Foundation" or "Dialogue OS" to Avoid Denying Faith or Thought. Let’s Establish a Common Grammar Before Ideology. A Base Program for a Pluralistic Society. Techniques to Dismantle Fixed Ideas.

You Can Choose Secular Ideologies Freely, but There Is a Prerequisite: A "Conversation Foundation" or "Dialogue OS" to Avoid Denying Faith or Thought. Let’s Establish a Common Grammar Before Ideology. A Base Program for a Pluralistic Society. Techniques to Dismantle Fixed Ideas. A. Conclusion The world is too fragmented by ideologies. Before we can even ask which one is correct, conversation itself fails to occur. Therefore, I propose this: Not a unification of religious or political thought, but rather that we first adopt a "Common OS" that allows us to converse without needing to agree. B. The Fact There are moments when we use the same words but point to entirely different things. "Freedom," "Justice," "Nation," "Tradition," "Equality." The more convenient the word, the more people see a concrete entity within it and come to blows. What is needed, before finding the correct answer, is a method to untangle the moment words harden. C. Religious Consideration & Harmony Let me state this first: I do not deny religion, nor do I take away the choice of political thought. However, regardless of one's position, there is a common cause that collapses arguments: the reification of concepts and the opacity of inference. I want to propose a "minimal common grammar" to reduce only these elements. "Share a deep Base OS (Emptiness, Structure, Logic), and upon that, political preferences are chosen individually." This is designed to submerge religious wars and ideological battles one level deeper into a "layer of mutual understanding." 1) Are Buddhism, Modern Philosophy, and Modern Mathematics less likely to fight with the Bible? The spark of conflict is often not "does God exist," but rather the "usage of language." Buddhism (especially Emptiness/Ku) and Post-structuralism trend toward "not viewing things as substances," "doubting fixed essences," and "inspecting the function of words." This is actually compatible with Negative Theology (Apophatic theology) within theology, and traditions that "do not fence God in with concepts." On the other hand, as you say, from a religious organization's perspective, the fact that believers might read scripture relatively can be difficult to govern. This is the point of friction. It is not so much a denial of the content of faith, but rather that the dispersion of interpretative authority is disliked. 2) Introducing "Rigorous Symbolic Logic Thinking" to Japan is actually compatible with Buddhism Intuitively, Zen and Emptiness are often misunderstood as "discarding logic," but the reality is the opposite. To discern: Where words arbitrarily reify (become substantialized) Which inference is making a leap Where binary oppositions are generated Rigorous logical training becomes a weapon. In other words, the "opportunity to learn Western logic (not the colloquial kind)" that you mention does not contradict the implementation of Emptiness. Rather, it can serve as a "precision device for Emptiness." 3) A Prescription for the Stifling Nature of "Polymathism" This can be avoided by design. The point is not "study everything," but to boil it down to a "minimal common grammar." Not "learn all subjects," but "let's possess the minimum 'literacy' valid in conversations worldwide." That literacy consists of what you call: "Emptiness," "Structure," and "Logic (Transparency of Inference)." This reduces the "macho" aspect of encyclopedic learning and makes it practical. 4) The Strength of the Model: "Base OS is Shared, Secular Ideologies are Chosen Individually" This model does not "erase" political conflict but civilizes the way we conflict. One can realize what they are reifying that causes the dispute. One can grasp the opponent's position not as "evil" but as a "structural preference." One can offer their own argument not as an absolute, but as a "provisional model." In short, the common foundation is not "agreement" but dialogue possibility. 5) Sartre's Example is Quite Suggestive The two-layer structure of "Metaphysically free, but preferring Communism in secular policy." This "stratification" is crucial and isomorphic to your concept. Upper Layer: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Linguistics (This is the Common OS) Lower Layer: Policy, Institutions, Party Preference (Choose here) For example, within this framework, a Communist and a Liberal can dispute each other not as "heretics," but as proponents of different prescriptions. If you say "Base it on Buddhism or Modern Philosophy," it looks like an imposition of religion or ideology. So, changing the expression makes it stronger: "Buddhism" → Emptiness = Training against reification "Post-structuralism" → Inspection of the conditions of meaning generation "Logic" → Audit of inference (Visualization of errors) And think of the slogan as: "Before faith or ideology, let's hold a Dialogue OS." On the premise of not denying any religion or political thought, let us simply share a "viewpoint that does not reify (Emptiness)," a "perspective on how meaning is born (Structure)," and a "manner of checking inferences (Logic)" before debating. Upon that, one may freely choose their secular ideology. The world has too many religions and ideologies. Moreover, they all have their own logic, and they all save or hurt people. So, I want to propose this: This is not a talk about unifying faith or political thought, but rather the opposite—it is about holding a "Common OS" to talk while remaining in disagreement. The core of that OS requires only three things. The first is an idea close to the Buddhist concept of "Emptiness" (Ku). It is to doubt the habit of assuming words and concepts are "substances." Enemy/Friend, Justice/Evil, Nation, Tradition, Freedom, Equality. The more convenient the word, the more it rigidifies people. Emptiness is not "nothingness," but the training of "not grasping things as fixed essences." The second is the perspective of Structuralism or Post-structuralism. Meanings do not stand alone; they are born within relationships, differences, and systems. Do not dismiss things based solely on individual good or evil; look at the conditions of generation. The third is the precision of Symbolic Logic. Visualize leaps in inference and make arguments not about "spirit/guts" but subject to inspection. If these three can be shared, you can choose your secular ideology freely. Liberalism, Social Democracy, Communism—adopt whatever suits your preference or the times. What is important is not to put ideology on a pedestal (god shelf), but to treat it as a tool. Faith is the same. Do not deny it. Just do not make the interpretation monolithic. If there is a Common OS, the world becomes much easier to talk in. Argument shifts from winning and losing to design and correction. A Little More Detail This text does not assert the superiority of any specific religion or political ideology, but proposes a minimal meta-framework to reduce "reification of concepts" and "opacity of inference," which are the main causes of mutual misunderstanding and hostility. The framework here does not aim for the unification of worldviews, but is a "Dialogue OS" that enhances the possibility of dialogue while premising the plurality of values. The proposed OS consists of three layers. First is the layer of "Emptiness." Emptiness in Buddhist thought is not nihilism, but can be read as a vigilance against the tendency to grasp concepts as fixed substances. Many political conflicts become rigid when words like freedom, equality, nation, ethnicity, tradition, and justice are treated not as variable working hypotheses but as inviolable entities. This layer functions as an epistemological training to de-reify concepts and redeploy arguments as provisional models. Second is the layer of "Structure." Structuralist and post-structuralist perspectives emphasize that meaning and a subject's self-understanding are generated by the arrangement of relationships, differences, institutions, and discourses. By establishing the conditions of generation as the object of analysis rather than reducing conflict to "individual morality" or "essential attributes," criticism can more easily shift from character attacks to institutional design. This layer plays the role of avoiding single-cause theories and visualizing the conditions of conflict as multiple axes. Third is the layer of "Logic." Logic here is not the colloquial "correct argument," but logic as an audit device for discussion: transparency of inference forms, organization of implications, and assurance of falsifiability. Even if Emptiness and Structure loosen the "grasping of concepts" and "simplification of causes," consensus formation is difficult to operate if inferences are not inspectable. The logic layer connects discussion not to emotion or authority, but to the process of verification and correction. The adoption of this three-layer OS does not necessarily conflict with religious faith. It does not deny faith, but makes inspectable the phases where expressions of faith are reclaimed by the reification of concepts. However, in religious communities, the concentration of interpretative rights may contribute to governance stability, so the spread of the OS may cause friction by promoting relativization. Therefore, this proposal should be presented not as conversion or unification, but as raising the baseline of dialogue capacity. The scope of this OS lies in the point that it does not bind the choice of political thought. Liberalism, Social Democracy, Communism, etc., are options in the "secular layer" that each person can adopt as differences in value priorities and institutional designs. What is important is that the secular layer is not absolutized, but placed within a framework where mutual criticism and updating are possible via Emptiness, Structure, and Logic. In this case, conflict is treated not as a judgment of good and evil, but as a comparison and correction of systems. In conclusion, this OS is an attempt to commonize the procedures of dialogue while maintaining the plurality of worldviews, rather than unifying them. Counter-Argument Q&A (Anticipated Questions) Q1. Won't "Relativism" lead to "Anything goes"? No, it won't. The "Emptiness" mentioned here does not make arguments "meaningless," but inspects the habit of reifying and absolutizing arguments. Rather, what prevents "anything goes" is the Layer of Logic (Audit of Inference) placed simultaneously. Untangle rigidity with Emptiness, and inspect with Logic. Therefore, the core becomes not "Relativism" but Modifiability (Updateability). Q2. Isn't this ultimately forcing us to "accept Buddhism as a premise"? It is not an imposition, but an adoption of function. Using the word "Emptiness" is for convenience; the goal is "training not to grasp concepts as fixed entities." You may achieve the equivalent function using terms from other traditions (Negative Theology, Skepticism, Scientific Methodology). The function is the substance, not the label. Q3. Aren't Structuralism and Post-structuralism too difficult to generalize? We do not say "read everything," but introduce only the minimal habits. For example, "Don't dismiss it just by individual good/evil; look at the arrangement of institutions and relationships." This single line is sufficiently structural. Specialized theory is for the advanced course; for the general public, it can be boiled down to thinking checklist items. Q4. If we include Logic (Symbolic Logic), won't we lose our humanity? Logic is a tool not to become cold, but to reduce misunderstandings and leaps. It does not exclude emotions or values, but makes transparent "where the facts end and value judgments begin" and "whether there are counter-examples." To protect humanity, we rescue discussion from mere "spirit/guts." Q5. Will it still not conflict with religion (especially scripture-based religion)? Conflict is more likely to occur over interpretative rights than over the existence of God. The Common OS does not deny faith, but visualizes logical leaps and the reification of words when faith is absolutized. This can be inconvenient for religious governance. Therefore, this proposal is appropriate to present not as conversion, but as Dialogue Capacity in the Public Space. Q6. If we have a Common OS, won't political passion weaken and society stop changing? The aim is not to extinguish passion, but to transform destructive passion into designable passion. Anger can be fuel for institutional criticism. However, if there is reification of concepts and leaps in inference, anger tends to flow toward scapegoating. The OS redirects anger from "who to crush" to "what to change." Q7. Won't "Emptiness" destroy morality? Good and evil seem to become ambiguous. The idea is not to erase good and evil, but to return good and evil to a form usable as tools. Absolutized good and evil easily turn into justifications for dehumanizing opponents. Emptiness is not "do not speak of good and evil," but a brake saying "do not cause a runaway of concepts when speaking of good and evil." Q8. How is this different from "The Golden Mean" or "Peace-at-any-price"? It is not the Golden Mean. The OS is not about "listing both sides and ending it," but a method to move forward in a modifiable form by inspecting: Where concepts were reified (Emptiness) What generating conditions were at work (Structure) Whether the inference is valid (Logic) It is not a technique to postpone conclusions, but a technique for making conclusions. Q9. Isn't it idealistic for the whole world to share this? Of course, it is impossible to do all at once. That is why we make it a minimal set. Just like "Education, Medicine, Law," there are things where minimal standards are shared even if they don't match perfectly worldwide. The OS is the same; we nurture it first as a common grammar in the public sphere. It is not idealism, but an approach of Standardization. Q10. So ultimately, does it mean any secular thought is fine? It is the stance of "leaving the freedom to choose," rather than "anything is fine." Liberalism, Social Democracy, Communism—all have strengths and weaknesses. The OS enables that comparative examination and ensures we "do not put ideology on a pedestal." Ideology is not an object of faith, but a tool to apply to reality and modify. Common Counter-Argument Q&A (Appendix) The proposal here is not to "unify thought or religion," but to share a "Dialogue OS" for talking without agreeing. The key points of the text are: "Emptiness" = Untangle the reification of concepts (Removal of fixed ideas) "Structure" = Look at the conditions generating meaning (Relationships, Differences, Institutions) "Logic" = Make inference auditable (Inspection of leaps)

世俗思想は好きに選べる、ただし前提がある、信仰も思想も否定しないための“会話の土台”「対話のOS」、思想の前に共通文法を持とう、多元社会のための基底プログラム、固定観念を外す技術

世俗思想は好きに選べる、ただし前提がある、信仰も思想も否定しないための“会話の土台”「対話のOS」、思想の前に共通文法を持とう、多元社会のための基底プログラム、固定観念を外す技術 A. 結論 世界は思想で割れすぎている。どれが正しいか以前に、まず会話が成立しない。だから私は提案する。宗教や政治思想を統一しよう、ではない。**一致しないまま話せるための「共通OS」**を先に持とう。 B. 事実 同じ言葉を使っているのに、まったく別のものを指している瞬間がある。「自由」「正義」「国」「伝統」「平等」。便利な言葉ほど、人はそこに実体を見て殴り合う。そこで必要なのは、正しい答えより先に、言葉が固まる瞬間をほどく作法だ。 C. 宗教配慮・融和 最初に言っておく。私は宗教を否定しないし、政治思想の選択も奪わない。ただ、どの立場であれ、議論が崩れる共通の原因がある。概念の実体化と推論の不透明性だ。これだけを減らす「最小の共通文法」を提案したい。 ________________________________________ 「深い基底OS（空・構造・論理）を共有して、その上で政治的選好は各自が選ぶ」。 これは宗教戦争やイデオロギー戦を“相互理解の層”で一段沈める設計になってます。 1) 仏教・現代哲学・現代数学は聖書と喧嘩しにくい？ 喧嘩の火種は「神がいるか」より、むしろ “言語の使い方” です。 • 仏教（特に空）やポスト構造主義は、 「実体視しない」「固定した本質を疑う」「言葉の働きを検査する」方向に行く。 • これは、神学の中でも 否定神学（アポファティック） や、 「神を概念で囲い込まない」伝統とは相性が良い。 一方で、教団的にはおっしゃる通り、信者が経典宗教を“相対化して読めてしまう”のは、統治面では扱いづらい。ここが摩擦点ですね。信仰内容への否定というより、解釈権の分散が嫌われる。 2) 日本に「記号論理学的な硬い思考」を入れるのは、実は仏教と相性がいい 直感として、禅や空は「論理を捨てろ」みたいに誤解されがちですが、実際は逆で、 • どこで言葉が勝手に実体化するか • どの推論が飛躍しているか • 二項対立がどこで生成されるか を見抜くには、硬い論理訓練は武器になります。 つまり、先生のいう「西洋型の論理（通俗でない）を学ぶ機会」って、空の実装と矛盾しない。むしろ “空の精密化装置” になり得る。 3) 「ポリマス主義」が息苦しい問題への処方箋 ここは設計で回避できます。ポイントは「勉強せえ」ではなく “最低限の共通文法” に落とすこと。 • すべて学べ、ではなく 世界中の会話で最低限通用する“読み書き”だけ持とう という位置づけにする。 • その読み書きが、先生の言う 「空」「構造」「論理（推論の透明化）」。 これなら教養主義のマッチョさを減らして、実用にできます。 4) 「基底OSは共有、世俗思想は各自が選ぶ」モデルの強み これ、政治対立を“消す”のではなく、対立の仕方を文明化するモデルです。 • 何を実体視して揉めているのかを自覚できる • 相手の立場を「悪」ではなく「構造上の選好」として把握できる • 自分の主張も、絶対化ではなく「暫定モデル」として差し出せる つまり、共通の土台は「一致」ではなく 対話可能性。 5) サルトルの例はかなり示唆的 「形而上は自由、世俗の政策選好は共産主義寄り」という二層構造。 この“二層化”が大事で、先生の構想と同型です。 • 上層：形而上・認識論・言語論（ここは共通OS） • 下層：政策・制度・政党選好（ここは選べ） 例えばこの枠組なら、共産主義でも自由主義でも、互いを「異端」ではなく 別の処方箋として争えます。 ________________________________________「仏教や現代哲学を前提にしろ」だと、宗教や思想の押し付けに見えやすいです。 なので表現をこう変えると強くなります。 • 「仏教」→ 空＝反実体化の訓練 • 「ポスト構造主義」→ 意味の生成条件の点検 • 「論理学」→ 推論の監査（ミスの可視化） そしてスローガンは “信仰や思想の前に、対話のOSを持とう” と思って下さい。 ________________________________________ どの宗教も、どの政治思想も否定しない前提で、議論する前に“実体化しない見方（空）”と、“意味がどう生まれるかを見る視点（構造）”と、“推論を点検する作法（論理）”だけは共有してみましょう。 その上で、世俗の思想は自由に選べばいいです。 世界には宗教も思想も多すぎます。しかも、どれもそれなりに筋が通っていて、どれも人を救ったり傷つけたりします。だからこう提案したいです。信仰や政治思想を統一しようという話ではなく、むしろ逆で、**一致しないまま話せるための「共通OS」**を持とう、という話です。 そのOSの核は三つだけでいいです。 一つ目は、仏教の「空」に近い発想。言葉や概念を、つい“実体”だと思い込む癖を疑う。敵味方、正義悪、国民、伝統、自由、平等。便利な言葉ほど人を硬直させる。空は「何もない」ではなく、「固定した本質として握りしめない」訓練です。 二つ目は、構造主義やポスト構造主義の視点です。意味は単体で立たず、関係や差異や制度の中で生まれます。個人の善悪だけで片づけず、生成条件を見ます。 三つ目は、記号論理学的な精密さ。推論の飛躍を見える化し、議論を“気合い”ではなく検査可能にします。 この三つが共有できれば、世俗の思想は自由に選べばいいです。自由主義でも社会民主主義でも共産主義でも、好みや時代に応じて採用すればいいです。大事なのは、思想を神棚に上げず、道具として扱えることです。 信仰も同じです。否定しない。ただ、解釈を一枚岩にしない。共通OSがあれば、世界はもっと話しやすくなります。議論は勝ち負けから、設計と修正へ移ります。 ________________________________________ もうちょっと詳しく 本稿は、特定の宗教や政治思想の優越を主張するものではなく、相互不理解や敵対の主因となりやすい「概念の実体化」と「推論の不透明性」を減らすための、最小限のメタ枠組みを提案する。ここでいう枠組みは、世界観の統一を目的とせず、むしろ価値観の多元性を前提にしたまま対話可能性を高める「対話のOS」である。 提案するOSは三層からなる。第一に「空」の層である。仏教思想における空は、虚無主義ではなく、概念を固定的実体として把握する傾向への警戒と読める。多くの政治的対立は、自由・平等・国家・民族・伝統・正義といった語を、可変的な作業仮説ではなく、不可侵の実体として扱う局面で硬直化する。本層は、概念の実体化を解除し、主張を暫定モデルとして再配置するための認識論的訓練として機能する。 第二に「構造」の層である。構造主義およびポスト構造主義的視点は、意味や主体の自己理解が、関係・差異・制度・言説の配置によって生成されることを強調する。対立を「個人の道徳」や「属性の本質」に還元するのではなく、生成条件を分析対象として立てることで、批判は人格攻撃から制度設計へと移行しやすくなる。この層は、単一原因論を避け、対立の条件を複数の軸として可視化する役割を担う。 第三に「論理」の層である。ここでいう論理は通俗的な“正論”ではなく、推論形式の透明化、含意関係の整理、反例可能性の確保といった、議論の監査装置としての論理である。空と構造が「概念の握り込み」や「原因の単純化」を緩めても、推論が検査可能でなければ合意形成は運用上成立しにくい。論理層は、議論を感情や権威ではなく、検証と修正のプロセスに接続する。 この三層OSの採用は、宗教的信仰と必ずしも対立しない。信仰を否定するのではなく、信仰表現が概念の実体化に回収される局面を点検可能にするからである。もっとも、教団的共同体においては、解釈権の集中が統治安定に資する場合があり、OSの普及は相対化を促す点で摩擦を生む可能性がある。ゆえに本提案は、改宗や統一ではなく、対話能力の底上げとして提示されるべきである。 本OSの射程は、政治思想の選択を拘束しない点にある。自由主義、社会民主主義、共産主義などは、価値優先順位や制度設計の差異として、各人が採用しうる「世俗レイヤ」の選択肢である。重要なのは、世俗レイヤが絶対化されず、空と構造と論理によって、相互批判と更新が可能な枠内に置かれることである。このとき対立は、善悪の断罪ではなく、制度の比較と修正として取り扱われる。結論として、本OSは世界観の単一化ではなく、世界観の多元性を保ったまま、対話の手続きを共通化する試みである。 ________________________________________ 反論Q&A（想定問答集） Q1. 「相対主義＝何でもあり」になりませんか？ **なりません。**ここで言う「空」は、主張を“どうでもいい”にするのではなく、主張を実体化して絶対化する癖を点検するものです。 むしろ「何でもあり」を防ぐのは、同時に置く **論理の層（推論の監査）**です。 空で硬直をほどき、論理で検査する。だから「相対主義」ではなく **可修正性（アップデート可能性）**が中心になります。 Q2. それって結局「仏教を前提にしろ」という押し付けでは？ 押し付けではなく、機能としての採用です。 「空」という語を使うのは便宜で、目的は「概念を固定実体として握りしめない訓練」。別の伝統の言葉（否定神学、懐疑主義、科学的方法論）で同等の機能を実現しても構いません。ラベルではなく 働きが本体です。 Q3. 構造主義やポスト構造主義は難しくて一般化できないのでは？ “全部読め”ではなく、最小限の癖だけ導入します。 例えば「個人の善悪だけで片づけず、制度や関係の配置を見る」。この1行で十分に構造的です。専門理論は上級編で、一般向けは 思考のチェック項目に落とせます。 Q4. 論理（記号論理学）を入れると、人間味が失われませんか？ 論理は冷酷になるためではなく、誤解と飛躍を減らすための道具です。 感情や価値観を排除するのではなく、「どこまでが事実で、どこからが価値判断か」「反例があるか」を透明化する。 人間味を守るために、議論を“気合い”から救出します。 Q5. それでも宗教（特に経典宗教）とは衝突しませんか？ 衝突は「神の有無」より、解釈権で起きやすいです。 共通OSは、信仰を否定しませんが、信仰を絶対化する際の論理の飛躍や言葉の実体化を見える化します。これは教団統治にとって不都合な場合がある。だから本提案は 改宗ではなく、公共空間での 対話能力として提示するのが適切です。 Q6. 共通OSを持つと、政治的な情熱が弱まって社会が変わらないのでは？ 情熱を消すのではなく、破壊的な情熱を設計可能な情熱へ変える狙いです。 怒りは制度批判の燃料になり得ます。ただ、概念の実体化と推論の飛躍があると、怒りはスケープゴートへ流れやすい。OSは、怒りを「誰を潰すか」から「何を変えるか」へ向け直します。 Q7. 「空」は道徳を壊しませんか？善悪が曖昧になりそうです 善悪を消すのではなく、善悪を“道具として使える形”に戻す発想です。 絶対化された善悪は、相手を人間扱いしない正当化に転びやすい。空は「善悪を語るな」ではなく、「善悪を語るときに概念の暴走を起こすな」というブレーキです。 Q8. それは“中庸”や“事なかれ主義”と何が違いますか？ 中庸ではありません。OSは「両論併記して終わり」ではなく、 • どこで概念が実体化したか（空） • どんな生成条件が働いたか（構造） • 推論は妥当か（論理） を点検して、修正可能な形で前に進むための方法です。結論を先送りする技術ではなく、結論の作り方の技術です。 Q9. 世界中がそれを共有するのは理想論では？ もちろん一気には無理です。だからこそ最小セットにします。 「教育・医療・法律」のように、全世界で完全一致しないけど最低限の規格が共有されるものはあります。OSも同じで、まずは公共圏での共通文法として育てる。理想論ではなく 規格化の発想です。 Q10. じゃあ結局、世俗思想は何でもいいの？ “何でもいい”ではなく、選ぶ自由を残すという立場です。 自由主義でも社会民主主義でも共産主義でも、長所と欠点がある。OSはその比較検討を可能にし、「思想を神棚に上げない」ようにします。思想は信仰対象ではなく、現実に当てて修正する 道具です。 よくある反論Q&A（付録） ここでの提案は「思想や宗教を統一する」のではなく、**一致しないまま話せるための“対話のOS”**を共有しよう、というものです。 本文の要点は以下です： • 「空」＝概念の実体化をほどく（固定観念の解除） • 「構造」＝意味の生成条件を見る（関係・差異・制度） • 「論理」＝推論を監査可能にする（飛躍の点検）

The Theory of Logos and "Kehai" (Presence) — Why Japanese and English Are So Fundamentally Different

The Theory of Logos and "Kehai" (Presence) — Why Japanese and English Are So Fundamentally Different 1. Introduction: Differences in Cognitive Processing The difference between Japanese and English (Western languages) is not merely a matter of grammar or vocabulary. It stems from a deeper divergence in the definition of "what language is," and even fundamentally different ways of using the brain and spirit. Understanding this distinction serves not only as a tool for language learning but also as a key to grasping how Japanese people perceive the world—a subject of philosophy and cultural anthropology. 2. The West Forbids the "Heart"; Japan Overflows with It At the root of language lies a religious worldview. Japanese culture is animistic; it perceives a "heart" (Buddha-nature, divinity, or presence) in everything—living organisms, inanimate objects, and empty space alike. The world is filled with "heart." In contrast, the West (Judeo-Christian culture) has a history of strictly prohibiting finding divinity in created things (anything other than the Creator), viewing it as idolatry. There is also a practical background: in a pastoral culture, one cannot survive if one empathizes too deeply with livestock. As a result, the Western psyche evolved to coldly separate the "Subject" (Human/God) from the "Object" (Things/Animals), whereas Japan maintained a worldview where they are blended. This is directly reflected in the linguistic structure. 3. Absolute Trust in "Logos" vs. "Fu-ryu-monji" The foundation of Western civilization is the idea that "The Word (Logos) is God." Just as the Bible represents God's truth, they believe that words are tools where the "Signified" (meaning) and "Signifier" (symbol) must match perfectly. Like mathematical analysis, words must converge on the object. Japan, however, holds the wisdom of "Fu-ryu-monji" (a Zen concept meaning truth cannot be conveyed by letters alone). We use not only "Text" but also the surrounding air and context to express the world. Words are not the only tool to describe the world, but merely one of many (and an imperfect one at that). This "Non-Text-Centrism" is the essence of the Japanese language. 4. The Curse of Grammar: Subject-Centrism vs. Predicate-Centrism Japanese people struggle with English education because they try to force Japanese into the "SVO" mold. English is a "Subject-Centered" language where the verb cannot be determined unless "Who (Subject)" is defined. This parallels the monotheistic worldview of confronting God as an individual. On the other hand, Japanese is a "Predicate-Centered" language. One can say "Ame da" (It is rain) without a subject like "It." As long as there is a predicate (what happened), the sentence holds. In the sentence "Zo wa hana ga nagai" (As for the elephant, its nose is long), "Zo wa" is not a grammatical subject but merely a topic marker. Attempting to dissect this with English grammar leads to failure. 5. Conclusion: Japanese as a Quantum Field To use modern analogies to describe the difference: Western Languages (Classical Physics/Particle): Aim to dissect the world with words and fix meaning to a single point (determining the position of the particle). It is a digital language that clarifies the "Figure" and discards the "Ground." Japanese (Quantum Theory/Field): Does not fix the meaning of words, maintaining a state of "superposition" of possibilities. It is an analog language that attempts to express not just the "Figure" but the "Ground" (Field/Atmosphere) itself. If Western languages are languages of "convergence" aiming for the coincidence of Signifier and Signified, Japanese is a language of "diffusion and resonance," where the Signifier contains "surplus (Kehai/Presence)" beyond the Signified. Neither is superior to the other. However, trying to understand Japanese using an English grammar book—effectively reading a manual for a different operating system—will inevitably lead to system errors.

Simple Differences Between Japanese and English (Western Languages)

Simple Differences Between Japanese and English (Western Languages) Differences Between Japanese and Western Speakers (Excluding Multilinguals) Japanese and Western languages (specifically Indo-European languages like English) are different. But there are levels to this difference. They differ at a pretty deep level. It’s a difference at the level of "What is language?" Or even deeper: if using language requires a brain and a spirit, then the way the brain and spirit are used is different. On a shallower level, the way of viewing the world and thinking is different. Knowing this might be useful for something—maybe for learning foreign languages, or perhaps for philosophy, cultural anthropology, comparative culture, or brain research. Japanese and Westerners Differ Beyond Just Language It’s not just language; the difference is deep. For example, Japanese culture feels a "heart" (mind/spirit) in everything—living things, non-living things, space, time. It is a culture that "puts heart into things." As a result, Japan is overflowing with "heart." If "heart" isn't the right word, you can call it "sensing God," "believing in Buddha-nature," "having emotions," or "valuing sensibility." Westerners aren't devoid of this, but there is a conscious or unconscious prohibition against it. For example, in biblical religions, feeling God in God is OK. But feeling God in created things (everything other than God) is prohibited. This might also be influenced by Greek philosophy. Also, it might be related to the difference between Japan’s long agrarian culture that prohibited eating mammals, and Western pastoral cultures that used and ate livestock. If you empathize too much with livestock, you can't survive. In Japan, we feel sorry for neutering pets or get "pet loss" syndrome, but that would be troublesome in a livestock culture. Western culture tends to avoid excessive emotion or sensation toward objects. As a result, while Japan is filled with "heart/animism," the West has areas where this is void or diluted. Even though Christianity is fading fast in the West, the input of over 1000 years doesn't vanish easily. The spiritual distance between Japanese and Westerners is likely still vast. Differences in Language Attitudes toward words differ. Western culture believes words can correspond to meaning exactly one-to-one. Or at least, they try to make them converge. It’s like mathematical convergence. The Bible is an example. In a world where the Word is absolute, the Word is God. Therefore, every word in the Bible accurately represents God. This comes from the Greek "Logos." Since the West believes "Signifier = Signified," they aim for convergence. Japan aims for the opposite—divergence. "Fu-ryu-monji" (Not Establishing Authority on Written Words) There is a Zen phrase, "Fu-ryu-monji." It means words and meaning never perfectly match, or that there are things words cannot express. This is the mainstream Japanese linguistic view. For deeply religious Westerners, this is inconvenient. If the Bible is the word of God, saying "meaning and words differ" is like picking a fight. Saussure was probably the first in Western linguistics to suggest something "Fu-ryu-monji"-like. His idea that the relationship between words and meaning is arbitrary must have been shocking. Generally, the West tries to match the Signifier and Signified (convergence), while Japan tends towards mismatch (divergence). Japan uses this mismatch in interesting ways, like Zen or "Ma" (negative space), "reading the air," or "Yugen." We use words to point at things that words cannot express (Context over Text). Grammar as a System Natural language isn't code, so it can't be perfectly systematized, but Western civilization has a strong will to systematize grammar. English grammar books show an obsession with this. Japanese grammar education has been influenced by this. Some scholars try to fit Japanese into English grammar frames, causing misunderstandings. For example, "He runs fast." Translated to Japanese, the most natural might be "Kare wa hashiru no ga hayai" (As for him, running is fast). But school grammar insists on "He runs fast" (SVM structure). Japanese is an SOV language, but maybe we shouldn't force it into English frames. "She likes cats." -> "Kanojo wa neko ga suki." Is "ga" a subject marker or an object marker here? English grammar gets confused. But Japanese doesn't need a subject. "Ga" just introduces something new. Japanese is "Predicate-centered." English is "Subject-centered." In English, you must decide the subject to determine the verb form (singular/plural). In Japanese, the predicate (verb/adjective) is king, and the subject is optional. Conclusion: Analogies Semiotics: Western languages aim for Signifier = Signified. Japanese Signifiers include "surplus" meaning (atmosphere) outside the Signified. Gestalt: Western languages describe the "Figure" (Figure) and cut out the "Ground." Japanese tries to describe the "Ground" (Background/Atmosphere) as well. Quantum Theory: Western languages act like classical physics or particles (collapsing the wave function to determine meaning: "A is B"). Japanese acts like a quantum field, maintaining a superposition of meanings until the very end.

かんたんな日本語と英語（西洋語）との違い

かんたんな日本語と英語（西洋語）との違い ・日本語話者と西洋語話者の違い（マルチリンガルを除く） 　日本語と英語をはじめとする西洋語（インドヨーロッパ語族とする）は違うます。 　違いにもレベルがあります。 　結構深いレベルで違います。 　「言葉とは何か」というレベルで違います。 　更にもっと深いレベルで違います。 　言葉を使う前提として脳や精神が必要ならば脳や精神の使い方が違います。 　もうちょっと浅い層でいえば物事や世界の見方、考え方が違います。 　多分そういうのを知っておくとなんかの役に立つかもしれません。 　べたに外国語学習に役に立つかもしれませんし哲学、文化人類学、比較文化論、脳や精神の研究レベルで役に立つかもしれません。 ・言葉以外にも日本人と西洋人は深いレベルで違う 　日本人と西洋人は言語の違いだけではなくて違う面でもかなり深いレベルで違います。 　例を挙げます。 　日本人は生物、非生物、空間、時間、その他を問わずあらゆる対象に心を感じる文化ですし、心を籠める文化です。 　結果として日本と日本には心があふれることになります。 　心という表現でよくなければ神を感じるでもいいですし仏性を持つと信じるでもいいですし感情を持つでもいいですし感性を大切にするでもいいです。 　西洋人にもそういうところがないわけではありません。 　しかし心を感じる、心を籠めるのを禁じる意識か無意識かその両方が働く場合があります。 　例えば聖書を使う宗教であれば神に神を感じるのはOKです。 　しかし想像した被造物、ということは神以外の全てに対して神を感じるのを禁止されています。 　これは聖書により決まっています。 　もしかしたらこれにギリシア哲学も加わるかもしれません。 　それに日本人のような純粋な農民文化を長らく続けて哺乳類などの動物を禁じてきた文化と牧畜や遊牧で哺乳類の家畜を食べたり使ってきたりした文化が関係するのかもしれません。 　家畜に感情移入してしまうといろいろ困ることになります。 　日本でもペットに対して去勢がかわいそうとかペットロスが生じますがそういうのが起こると家畜を扱う文化圏では厄介だということでしょう。 　あるいは昔の日本ではやったように気候の違いの問題かもしれません。 　神ではなくて仏性はどうかというと多分西洋人には仏性という考え方自体ないでしょう。 　感情移入や感じを実在的に捉えたり、あらゆる対象に心を感じる以上に心を感じたりすることを肯定的で積極的な日本人に対して、西洋文化ではあらゆる対象への過度な感情や感覚を持つことを忌避する部分があります。 　結果として日本と日本人は心だか神だか仏性だか感情だか感覚が満ち満ちることになります。 　他方西洋や西洋人では日本と日本人は心だか神だか仏性だか感情だか感覚を忌避したり欠落したり薄まる領域が生じます。 　ヨーロッパのキリスト教徒にせよイスラム教徒にせよキリスト教化やイスラム教化はたかだか千年余りで2000年は立っておらず、イスラムはともかくキリスト教は猛烈な勢いと速さで脱宗教家が進んでいる場合もあります。 　それでも1000年以上インプットし続けたものが簡単に消えるわけではないのかもしれませんが日本人と西洋人の距離は日本が鎖国を止めた150年くらい前と比べても全然神性の違いが減って同感、共感、同情性（シンパシー）が高まっていると思われます。 ・西洋の言語と日本の言語の違い 　まず言葉というものに対する考え方や態度や姿勢が異なります。 　西洋文化圏では言葉が意味を正確に一対一対応で現しうると考えます。 　そういうと言いすぎであれば言葉と意味を可能な限り近づけようとします。 　解析学の言葉でいえば収束させようとしる傾向があります。　 　聖書なんかは前者の例です。 　言葉が絶対の世界で言葉が神なので聖書の一言一句が性格に神の何かを正確に表しています。 　逆に言葉は何かを正確に表しえるという根拠になります。 　「言葉は神である」のギリシア語訳の言葉はロゴスという言葉の日本語訳です。 　この思想自体がヘレニズム、すなわちギリシア文化の影響を受けています。 　また聖書は宗派によりますが現在でいえば一冊の本というよりたくさんの本が集まった全集です。 　明治維新後聖書のことを「聖書全集」と言っていた人もいたようです。 　それが聖書を一冊の本と思っているベターな考え方だと思います。 　前週にどの本を加えるかは宗教や宗派によって違います。 　例えばユダヤ人の聖書はキリスト教徒の聖書とは違いますしカソリックやプロテスタントでも聖書は違います。 　プロテスタントも分派が多いので分派によっても違うかもしれません。 　日本語訳聖書は比較的最近再翻訳されたと思いますが、例えばその際にマカバイ記などの今まで乗っていなかった書を加える場合もあります。 　聖書全集の各書というか本は書かれている言語が一通りではなかったりします。 　例えばユダヤ教の聖書はユダヤ人がディアスポラはしていたものの非常に国粋主義的になった時期に編纂されたのでヘブライ語の本しか入っていなかったと思います。 　他にもアラム語で書かれたりギリシア語で書かれたりした本はあるのでそういうのはユダヤ教の聖書には載っていないと思います。 　ただアラム語で書かれた本にもギリシア語で書かれた本にもいい本があります。 　例えばバビロン捕囚後にユダヤ人が一次的に主権を回復した時期のことをギリシア語で書いたマカビー（マカバイ）記というのがありますがそれがないとバビロン捕囚からローマに支配されるまでの時期のユダヤの歴史が分からなくなります。 　聖書の歴史ではその後にキリスト教徒が聖書をギリシア語訳したりラテン語訳したのが大切です。 　その際には当然語訳もあります。 　聖書を日本語訳した際にも語訳はありました。 　これからも見つかるかもしれません。 　聖書の文献学的研究は20世紀入ってからで日本や中国の古典研究よりは遅いです。 　しかし文献学も含めて聖書やキリスト教の科学的研究は進んでいるのでそういうのが人々に影響を与えていくでしょう。 ・言葉と意味を一致させようとする態度 　日本語でも言葉と意味を一致させようとするときはあります。 　公文書や法的文書や契約書、学術論文や誤解やトラブルを避けようとする際には特にそういう意識が強くなるでしょう。 　ただ日本語はそうでない場合があります。 　西洋語でもそうでない場合はあると思いますが日本語ではそうでない場合の方が言語観の本質をなします。 ・不立文字 　禅の言葉に不立文字（ふりゅうもんじ）というもものがあります。 　言葉と意味が完全に一致することがないという考え方でもありますし、言葉では表せないものがあるという風に使われる場合もあります。 　これは日本と日本人の言語観の主流だと思います。 　他方で西洋人で聖書系宗教で信心深い人にはこの考え方は都合が悪いです。 　聖書は一言一句神の言葉です。 　聖書は絶対で神の言葉を表しているので意味と言葉が違うという考え方はある種の熱心な信者に喧嘩を売っているような感じになりかねません。 　不立文字的なことを言い始めたのは西洋の言語学ではソシュールが最初の頃の人だと思います。 　彼の提示した構造主義的な方法論よりかは「言葉と意味の関係は一定、絶対ではなく変わっていく」という結論の方が最初はインパクトが大きかったのではないでしょうか。 　中世神学や近代初期にも類する考え方はあったかもしれませんが信仰が堅固な宗教色のの強い地域でそういうことを言い歩いていたら大変な目に遭っていたのではないでしょうか。 　西洋の言語観に不立文字的なものがないと言わけではありません。 　また日本語が言葉がその表す対象、ソシュール的に言えばサイン（sign、記号）のシニフィアン（signifing）とシニフィエ(signified)が一致する正確、一対一で厳密、必要十分に対応するという考え方がないわけでもないかもしれません。 　ただ傾向として西洋語と西洋人と西洋文明はシニフィアンとシニフィエは一致する、あるいは一致させようとする極寄り、他方で日本と日本語と日本語はシニフィアンとシニフィエは一致しないというもう一方の極寄りです。 　これはどちらがいいとか悪いとかということではありません。 　どっちにもいい面も悪い面もあるでしょう。 　ただ日本文化系ではシニフィアンとシニフィエの不一致は西洋から見れば面白い方向に発展し、面白い使われ方をしていると見えるかもしれません。 　例えば仏教の禅の不立文字であれば一言でいえば西洋哲学でいう実在論を否定したければ否定するための考え方として使えます。 　これをゲシュタルト心理学でいうと西洋文明は言葉が図、言葉以外が地とすると西洋的には図しか洗わせられず、図で現せるもの、すなわち言葉で表せるもの以外は後景になり意識されなくなる場合があります。 　それに対して日本文化では図だけではなく地を言葉を使って表すことができます。 　そして言葉、言語、記号では表せないものを表現するために使うことができます。 　よく空気とか間とか余白とか不完全さとかわびさびとか幽玄とか日本文化論 　うまいこと整備すれば構造主義やポスト構造主義を西洋文化より簡単に組み込むことが可能です。 　実際組み込まれていて「空」「中道」「縁起」「中観」「中」などの言葉で表現されるものがそれです。 　またはシニフィアンとシニフィエの距離をどんどん開けていく、収束ではなく発散させるように使うこともできます。 　コンテクスト依存性を進めることで独特の文字の使用法が可能になります。 　一言でいうと「テクストもまたコンテクスト」みたいに考えることができるしそのような使い方を日本語は行ってきた歴史があります。 　世界でも事物でも対象でもいいですがそれを表現する方法はいろいろあります。 　絵でもいいし立体造形でもいいし動画でもいいし音楽などの芸術でもいいでしょう。 　言葉は世界を表現するための一つの道具ですがこの道具単体では世界を表現できない場合には言葉以外のものも合わせて使う必要があります。 　言葉をテクスト、言葉以外をコンテクストとして大まかに2つに分けてみましょう。 　コンテクストはテクストを使って表現できる場合もあれば、文化的な常識や通念として以心伝心で伝わるものもあれば先ほど例示したように絵でもいいし立体造形でもいいし動画でもいいし音楽などの芸術などその他さまざまなものがあります。 　このテクストとコンテクストを合わせて世界を表現するとします。 　例えば映画をセリフや動画や音楽で出来ているとしましょう。 　この場合はセリフが言葉でありテクストで動画や音楽はコンテクストと言えるかもしれません。 　では映画にとってセリフは動画や音楽に比べて特別化というと特別な場合もあるかもしれませんが特別でない場合もあるでしょう。 　このように見ると言葉というのは表現するための様々な方法、道具があるなかでの他の方法や道具に比べて特別ではない一つの道具にすぎません。 　表現の中で言葉を特別だと見る見方をテクスト中心主義というのであれば言葉を特別なものと見ない非テクスト中心主義とも呼べるような考え方もあります。 　日本文化では言葉を後者の見方でも見たり使ったりすることがあります。 　それに対して西洋文明では「言葉（ロゴス）は神である」です。 　これはユダヤ教とギリシア思想の合成です。 　結果として西洋文明はロゴス中心主義的でテキスト中心主義的でした。 　だからソシュールにみんなびっくりしたのかもしれません。 　その結果として面白いことが起こります。 　日本では「言葉は不完全でいい」「言葉は不完全なものだ」「文も不完全でいい」「文は不完全な文もある」という結論になり実際に古くから日本人と日本語の付き合い方はそんなものでした。 ・西洋にある文法は体系づけられるという考え方 　自然言語というのは論理学や数学やプログラミングのコードと違うのできれいで完璧に体系づけることはできません。 　でも西洋文明はもともと多分いろいろな理由で体系化への意志が強い言語です。 　これは一つの仮説ですが西洋の精神文化と西洋の言語の変化は両者の相互作用で形成されてきた側面があるのかもしれません。 　英語の文法書などを読むと体系化へのあくなき執念がみられます。 　もちろんそうでない部分も多いでしょう。 　ただこれは我々日本人にも関係します。 　日本では義務教育で英語を学びますし文法を学びます。 　義務教育以外でも英語や文法を学ばないといけない機会が多いでしょう。 　ですから英語的言語観とか英語的文法観を私たちは多かれ少なかれ身に着けるでしょう。 　そういう関わり方ともう一つ言語学者などの言語関係のアカデミックな領域での学者や研究者や教育者が西洋語の文法観の影響を受けている場合があります。 　日本語学者、国語学者が西洋言語の例えば英語文法的な考え方が日本語の文法の考え方に強い影響を与えている場合があります。 　日本語の文法を英語の文法に当てはめて解釈するという形をとる人がいてそういう人の国語文法書で我々が日本語を勉強するといろいろ齟齬や誤解が出る場合があります。 　例で考えてみましょう。 　英語の 「He runs fast.」 を考えてみましょう。 　これを日本語に訳すと、 「彼は速く走る」 「彼は走るのが早い」 「走るのが早いのだ、彼は」 「速く走るんだ、彼は」 「走るのが彼は速い」 「速い、彼は走るのが」 みたいな感じにできます。 　別にどれも間違えてはいないでしょう。 　英文法では（私は長らく英文法の勉強をしていませんが昔は英文法マニアでした）少なくとも昔は文型みたいなのから英文法の本は始まる傾向がありました。 　例えばSVとかSVCとかSVOとかSVOCとかSVOOとか今は知りませんが昔の初等的な文法書は5文型から始まる傾向がありました。 Sは主語、Vは動詞、Cは補語、Oは目的語といった感じになります。 　それで言えばこの分はSV（M）の形になります（Sは主語、Vは動詞、Mは修飾語（この場合は副詞））とします。 　英語のSVMのS、V、Mの語順が比較的自由に変えられるのは日本語の面白い所かもしれません。 　またこの場合英語で副詞として使われているfastが日本語では訳し方によって副詞になったり形容詞になったりしています。 　Fastは英語で形容詞としても副詞としても使われますがそう考えずに「形容詞の副詞用法」だとかなんだかいろいろな考え方があります。 　また日本語は体言止めにしても平叙文として成り立っています。 　ここで平叙文とは論理学と整合性をつけて真、偽を決定できる文ということにしておきましょう。 　6通りの翻訳の中で何となく英語の初級者の翻訳は「彼は速く走る」だと思います。 　これは多分文法で英語と日本語の語順は違って英語でSVMと書くものは日本語でSVMと訳すみたいな教育か学習を忠実に守るからでしょう。 　この場合主観的に言わせてもらうと日本語の訳は日本語でもSVM型の「彼は走るのが速い」が一番自然な日本語かもしれません。 　ただこの「主観的」とか「自然な日本語」とか「自然な翻訳」とかバリバリの理数系的思考というか原理主義的思考をする人にとっては胡散臭いことこの上ないです。 　ですから日本人のノーベル物理学賞受賞者で英語が苦手過ぎる人とか自閉スペクトラム症のアスペルガーっぽい人が学習で躓きやすいことがあると思われます。 　英語はSVO型の言語で日本語はSOV型の言語だという話もよく聞きます。 　世界の言語が何種類あるかしりませんがSOV文型の方が世界では昔から多いです。 　昔からというのは世界の少数言語の少数（話者）言語はどんどん消滅しているからです。 　話者人口はSVOかもしれませんが。 例えば 「she likes cats.」 で考えてみましょう。 　さっきのやり方に合わせて日本語翻訳してみましょう。 「彼女は猫が好き」 「彼女が好きなのは猫」 「猫を彼女は好き」 「猫が好きだ、彼女は」 「好きなんだ、彼女は猫が」 「好きなの、猫を彼女は」 英語文法に忠実ならlikeは好きという形容動詞よりは好むという動詞にした方がいいのではという突っ込みが入るかもしれません。 　そもそも英文語に述語とか述部という概念があるのか知りませんが国文法には述語とか述部という言葉があって英語の動詞に当たるVは日本語で述語として訳す場合は動詞でも形容詞でも形容動詞でもよかったりします。 　であれば日本語を無理に英語の文法や文型に充て跳ねる必要はないのではないか？という疑問が湧いた方がいるかもしれません。 　その疑問は全くその通りで日本語の文法を英語に合わせて作る必要はありません。 　「彼女は猫が好き」は有名な「象は鼻が長い」に似ていますね。 　「は」と「が」で主語が２つあるのか？とかどっちが主語なのか？とか「は」とは何かとか「が」とは何かという風に英語の文法を日本語に当てはめるといろいろな疑問が湧いてくる方もいるでしょう。 　私が大学の日本語の授業で留学生相手に授業のアシスタントをしていた頃には日本語の先生が「は」はテーマ助詞と言われて主語ではない、みたいなことを教わった記憶があります。 　テーマ助詞とは文全体の主題を表すことを示す助詞ということです。 　ただそういう見方もあるかもしれませんが別の見方をすることもできます。 　本当にいろいろな見方ができますがそもそも日本語の文には主語が必要がないという考え方があります。 　「は」も「が」もある場合には主格を表す助詞として使われるがそうでない場合もある、というものです。 「私は人間です」 この場合は「私は」は主語と考えてもいいでしょう。 　でも「象は鼻が長い」の場合には「象は」は主語ではなく文全体のテーマを提示するための接辞としての助詞と見なすことができます。 　「が」が必ず主語を表すかというと総とも限りません。 　「彼女は猫が好き」の「猫が」は英文法的には目的語でしょう。 　そうすると英文法に当てはめると「が」は主語も目的語も作りうる助詞、ということになります。 　ざっくり言ってしまうとそもそも「が」は新しいことを示す、文章や会話内に登場させるときに使う助詞です。 　別に結果としてそれが主語になろうが目的語になろうが日本語にとってはどっちでも構いません。 　そもそも日本語の文は主語も目的語も必要ない場合がたくさんあります。 　しかし英文法を日本語に当てはめて英文法で日本語から解釈する人にしてみれば特殊なことになるでしょう。 　でもそうでない人にとっては別に特殊なことではないかもしれません。 　英語や英文法しか知らない、あるいはあえて英語や英文法を日本語に当てはめて考えようとする場合にはいろいろ面白いことも多いですが学習効率の悪化を招いたりいろいろ齟齬や誤解を生じたりする場合も多いと思います。 　ですから別の考え方を知っておいた方がいいかもしれません。 　それは日本語独自で西洋語の影響を受けていない国語文法だったりします。 あるいはいろいろな言語やその文法を知っている人なら日本語に限らず何か新しい言葉を学ぼうとしたりその言葉の文法を学ぼうとする場合には、その学びたい言語の分布だけでなく、自分の知っているほかの言語やその文法を総動員して学ぶといろいろいいことがあるかもしれません。 新しい言葉の文法を学ぶと個人的な経験と見解ですがその言葉の読解力が飛躍的に高まります。 ただ読むのにはめちゃめちゃ役に立ちますが、書く、聞く、話す場面での威力は読む場合には及ばないような気がします。 ・ざっと現代日本語の歴史 　日本語も変遷があります。 　明治維新で変遷があり江戸期の教育をしっかり受けている層は漢文脈もピンインや平仄まで習っていると思われるので冠詞が書けたりします。 　明治期の教育をしっかり受けた人は候文を習っていると思います。 　大正末では候文は習っていなかったようです。 　戦後1970年頃の日本語教育では国語教育ではどこの文成分がどこの文成分にかかるという係り受け教育を徹底的にする傾向にあり大正時代にはそういう国語教育はなくもっと国語教育がいい加減で気楽だったという当時の人の感想が残っています。 　戦前は口語と文語の一致運動も大切です。 　ラジオ放送の始まったの戦後のテレビの普及の2つが現在の標準日本語の成立にかなり影響を与えているようです。 　大正12年生まれの司馬遼太郎によると1890年から1900年くらいまでに生まれた世代はそれ以後には失われたようなしっかりとした東京も含めた各地の方言、地域の口語が残っていると観察しています。 　これ以降の世代ではそれ以前の世代と方言の仕様について不連続性があるとするとそれは一部ラジオ、最も大きな影響はテレビの普及の影響ではないかと考察しています。 　万葉仮名は無理ですが万葉仮名でも現在の仮名に直してもらったり漢文でも返り点など入れて書き下し文にしたりフリガナを振るなどの補助があれば現代日本人は過去の日本語の現在残されている文献については雰囲気くらいは分かると思われます。 　日本語の歴史は口語であれ文章語であれ中国語（漢文）や梵語（サンスクリット語、インド語）、西洋語（明治以降）の影響を受けておりますが、他方で平安の宮廷文学の女流文学者たちのように漢文の影響の比較的少ない日本語も同時に残されています。 ・日本語の言語学的一般的な特徴 　まあ何であれ日本語は言語類型的には膠着語というものに属して助詞や助動詞の付着や用言の活用などで意味が決まる言葉です。 　他方で西洋語は英語などは分析語や孤立語と呼ばれる言語類型に属して、古典ラテン語や古典ギリシア語などは屈折語と呼ばれる名詞や連体修飾ができる品詞の格変化や動詞などの活用の変化が特徴的です。 　西ヨーロッパの言語ではフランス、スペイン、イタリアなどのラテン語系と英語、ドイツ語などのゲルマン語系がありますがここもグラデーション的な感じがあってフランス語などはスペイン語やイタリア語に近い所もあれば英語に近い、というか英語がフランス語に近い所があります。 　ラテン語起源の言語は屈折語から孤立語、分析語的な方向に変化していっているように見えます。 　ゲルマン系言語は古いゲルマン語を勉強したことがないので分かりませんが、ドイツ語と英語を比較するとドイツ語は屈折語と孤立語、分析語の両方の要素を残し、英語はどんどん屈折語の要素を失う方向に変化していっているように見えます。 　多分現代日本語に影響を与えている西洋語は主に英語、ドイツ語、フランス語だと思われます。 　西洋語は論理学や修辞学や文法（学？）の影響を強く受けてきた、あるいは西洋語は論理学や修辞学や文法を発達させた言語です。 　現代日本語の国語教育では西洋のそういった影響を受けたためかそうでないためか分かりませんが文法などを重視する傾向があるようです。 　多分小中学くらいの国語教育では係り受け、どこの文成分がどこにかかるみたいなのが強いと思われます。 　中学か航行か分かりませんがそれなりに古典文法や漢文法を勉強するようです。 　日本語には文法がなく後付けで文法らしきものを作った、という見解もありますが日本語独自のあまり英文法などの影響を受けていない国文法ということでは係り受けや、修飾、被修飾関係や動詞、形容詞、形容動詞、助動詞などの用言部分に関する活用変化がメインになると思われます。 　他方で現在は分かりませんが過去には日本語文法を英文法になぞらえて説明する教師たちも多かったです。 　どちらの立場でも日本語には法則がありその法則が文法ですから日本語には法則があるという観点に立っていたと思います。 文の分析の際には文成分は必ず何か他の文成分にかかるかかかられるかという観点、文成分の関係性に一致と呼応が必ずあり、対応を間違えると正しくない文とされるもの、あるいはどの文成分も必ず何か他の文成分を修飾するか修飾されているかがある、という観点で日本語を考えています。 そもそももっと本質的に言葉というものを考えると日本語でも映画でも文法が存在するかどうかという本質的な問題とともにさらに深掘りした本質として文というものが存在するのか、言葉（文章）は成文としての文に必ずきれいに分けられるのか、文というきれいな単位が存在するのか？という問いを立てられる可能性があります。 古文献には句読点やらコンマやピリオドやないどころかスペースや改行がない文献書籍も大量にあります。 学問的にはそういったよく分からない言葉のカオスと思われるものの中に文やら文法というものを見出していったのが言葉の歴史かもしれません。 文や文法がまず存在してその結果として言葉が生まれていったのか、言葉というものはもともとカオスであったが人間がそれを秩序付けたものが文や文法である、という見方もできて、もし後者なのであれば、そして前者であってもある一つの言語に対する文法というものは異なる複数のものが存在する必要があります。 　受験英文法では強迫的に英文をある英文法に当てはめる傾向が強い教え方がある一方で、ある文法だけでは解釈しきれない文や文成分というものもたくさんあって融通利かせて柔軟に解釈すべきである、という考え方とかいろんな教師がいるものと思われます。 ・ざっとまとめる：英語の場合 　筆が滑って長くなってしまいました。 　ざっと結論をまとめてみて最後の少し補う形にします。 　英語のエートスというか英語の基底をなし英語を貫く、あるいは英語が志向する精神性みたいなものをまとめてみます。 ① 英語はシニフィアンとシニフィエを一致させようとします。 ② そしてシニフィアンは固定的です。 ③ 更にはシニフィエも固定的です。 ④ 英語はロゴス中心的で、文中心的で、文法中心的です。 　 　上記のようなことがあるので英語の文法書はまずは文のプロトタイプみたいな直説法で三人称で（一人称の場合もあるかも）、単数で、時制は現在形で、単純相（完了相や進行相ではない）で、能動態で、極性が肯定（否定ではない）など文法的カテゴリー（その他まだある、例えば性など）と呼ばれるものの中から一番代表的で標準的なものと思われそうなものををまず示してその後、それらの各カテゴリーにはどんなものがありカテゴリー内で変化をつけることでどのように文が変わるか（例えば直説法でなく命令法にする、肯定文ではなく否定文にするなど）を勉強していく体裁を取ります。 　平叙文中心主義、とでも言ってもいいかもしれません。 　また言葉は研究や学習のためのものでなく現実に使用するものです。 　そういう実使用論的、実際に言葉を使う場では時間をかけて考えてから発するのでは会話などがぎくしゃくしてしまうので反射的に判断・決断・実行するスポーツのようなものです。 　そういう実施陽的な世界では英語も文法書通りにはいかず破格的なイレギュラーさや文法に照らすと間違っているバグみたいなものが自然に成立する日本語みたいな面も当然あります。 ・ざっとまとめる：日本語の場合 　英語と対置させる形で日本語を示してみましょう。 　日本語は、 ① シニフィアンとシニフィエが一致していなくても全然良い ② 固定したシニフィアンなどない ③ 固定したシニフィエもない ④ ロゴスがなくてもよい というないない尽くしになります。 　例えば、 「いたっ」 これも日本語の文です（言語には必ず文が存在するという立場からすれば）。 「あかんわ」 「シーン」 「…」 「まさか！」 「そんな！」 「ん？」 「ね！」 「ね？」 「かあ」 「ですね」 「うん（null or ! or ?） 「う～ん…」 「(主語は不確定でいい)降ってきた（ね）」 こんなんも文ですし、何にもかからない、文にも文成分にもかからない文成分があってもいいです。 　文が存在するという立場からすればこういうものは文の何かの要素が省略されたものと見てもいいかもしれません。 　ただ文があるという立場であっても「草生える」「ｗ」これ自体が文という考え方もあります。 　「きれいですね」 という発言に 「何が？」 と返したら野暮過ぎて物を知らない者として共同体から排除や村八分にあってしまうかもしれません（ 　また文というのは文章の最小の構成要素ではなく、最大の構成要素でもなく、その間の何かなのかもしれません。 　あるいは繰り返しますが言葉に「文」という正規、正則な標準化された単位が必要だ、という考え方がもしかしたら西洋中心主義な視点に過ぎないのかもしれません。 　言葉の定義にもよりますが最近のＡＩなどの進化により最近は動物も言葉をしゃべることが分かっています。 　もしかしたら泣き方やその組み合わせによって何かを伝えているだけかもしれません。 　でもそれなら中国語や漢字、漢文だってそうかもしれません。 　それは文ではないとか不完全な文だというのは文中心主義的な考え方です。 　もっと言うと言葉中心、ロゴス中心主義で何にでも真偽があるとか正しいものと正しくないものがあるとか、正義と悪があるみたいな考え方でそこから零れ落ちるものには目を向けない、あるいは目に入らない、あるいは黙殺する、ないことにする考え方です。 　終助詞、感嘆詞、間投詞、感動詞、陳述や呼応の副詞、副助詞、接続助詞、擬態語、擬音語、または敬意や丁寧表現のような英語にはないカテゴリーもたくさんありますし、語、詞、辞もたくさんあるでしょう。 ・英語の主語中心主義と日本語の述語中心主義 　抽象度を高めて考えれば言葉と言うものは文を持つ必要はないかもしれません。 　ただ英語は文法中心主義で平叙文中心主義です。 中心主義という言葉を使いすぎかもしれませんが。 その英語的平叙文の考え方でいうと「日本語は主語がない場合がある！？」みたいな感じになります。 変わりに英文法の言葉というより国文法の言葉で言えば述部が重視されるように見えます。 述部は動詞、形容詞、形容動詞からなりそれぞれ活用し助動詞が膠着します。 孤立語や分析語のように助動詞は語ではなく接辞、接尾語です。 他の文成分、体言や主部や修飾語、修飾部はいらないという意味では述部中心主義と言えるかもしれません。 他方で英語の平叙文は主語が最も重要で次が動詞、そのあとが自動詞や他動詞など決める補語や目的語、そしてそれ以外の就職成分の形で重要なように見えます。 主語と動詞のどちらが重要かは分かりにくい所ですが英語が過去ドイツ語やラテン語のように屈折語の要素が強かったのに歴史とともにそれを失い三単現で動詞の語尾変化を残すのみとなりその代わりラテン語などのように主語が必要ない平叙文というのはなくなり主語が必ず必要になり主語や主部となる名詞や体言の可算性や数、人称による動詞の変化がなくなる方向に進化したことから主語が動詞を決める言語と考えた方が考えやすいのではないでしょうか。 とすると英語の主語中心主義に対して日本語の述部中心主義というのが対称をなすと考えるとわかりやすくなります。 ただあくまで言葉というものは文あるいは平叙文というものがあり文法というものもあるという前提に立つとそう見えるだけです。 もっと抽象化すると日本語は文も平叙文も文法も必要な意図も考えられます。 「ね。」 「そうでしょ？」 　「きれいな月…」 　全部日本語ではそれ単体で言葉となります。 　日本文化と日本人にとっての言葉というものは言葉単体で意味を成すものではなく言葉を含めたその他のいろいろなものを総動員して意味を表現するための一要素にすぎません。 　もっといえば意味すら必要ありません。 　というのが言いすぎなら意味の確定は必要ありません。 　多義的でもいいし無限の意味の可の姓を持つ、あるいは曖昧な意味であることが本質的であってもよいのです。 　英語のように主語という定点は必要ないし確定した意味すら必要ないということになります。 「英語は「文の中に世界を畳む」言語で、日本語は「世界の中に文を置く」言語だ」ということができるかもしれません。 　 ・日本語は言外を表すことを志向する 　次のように考えてみましょう。 西洋語は言葉が意味を確定させる方向性、日本語は言葉が意味を確定できないことを強調するエートスかパトスか持っている感じです。 パトスも持っているなら西洋語の言語進歩の方向性は人々が言葉をより意味を確定させるように進歩し、日本語は言葉が意味を確定させない方向に努力する、は強すぎな言い方かもしれませんが言葉が意味を確定するということは内的な意識を失わないようにしつつ、それに基づく西洋とは違う言葉の使い方を発達、深化させた可能性があります。 例えばシニフィアンとシニフィエの一致、収束を西洋語は目指し、日本語は目指さないどころかシニフィエ以外のものをシニフィアンが表す能力を持つ。ゲシュタルトの図と地ならば西洋語は図だけを表すが日本語は図も表すのを志す。言外とでもいうべきものでしす。 量子場理論でいえば西洋語は素粒子のみを表し日本語は素粒子でない場も表すことができるというアナロジーが成り立ちます。 この3つのアナロジー（記号論、ゲシュタルト、量子場理論）は、日本語と西洋語の本質的な違いを説明するモデルになります。 それぞれの視点から、その「日本語が目指した深化の方向性」を掘り下げてみます。 1. 記号論的視点：シニフィアン（言葉）とシニフィエ（意味） 西洋語がシニフィアンとシニフィエの「完全な一致・収束（$1=1$）」を目指すというのは、まさにその通りです。言葉は「定義」であり、対象を他のものから区別するラベルです。 一方で、日本語のシニフィアンは、対象そのもの（シニフィエ）を指し示すだけでなく、**「その周辺に漂う何か（余剰）」**を含んで機能します。 • 西洋語（指差す言語）： 「これは『悲しみ』である」。言葉が意味をピン留めし、固定します。 • 日本語（喚起する言語）： 言葉はあくまで「呼び水」です。「もののあわれ」や「切なさ」といった言葉は、辞書的な意味（シニフィエ）以上に、その場の空気、話者の身体感覚、季節の移ろいといった**「名付け得ないもの」を、受け手の心の中に再現させるためのトリガー**として機能します。 つまり、日本語は意味を確定させないことで、「言葉にする前の生々しい意識（クオリア）」を殺さずに伝達しようとする高度な技術を発達させたと言えます。 2. ゲシュタルト的視点：図（Figure）と地（Ground） この比喩も極めて鋭いです。 • 西洋語（図の言語）： ルビンの壺で言えば、西洋語は「壺」か「顔」か、どちらか一方を「図」として明確に認識し、記述します。「地（背景）」はノイズとして切り捨てられます。文法的に主語（図）を立てないと文が成立しないのが良い例です。 • 日本語（地の言語）： 日本語は、あえて「図」を明確にせず、「地（背景・文脈・空気）」そのものを記述しようとします。「雨が降っている」ではなく「雨だ」と言ったり、主語を省略したりするのは、「私」や「雨」という個別の「図」よりも、「雨が降っているという状況全体（場）」を表現したいためです。 これは「意味を確定させない」のではなく、**「全体性（全体の関係性）を崩さないために、あえて部分を確定しない」**という戦略です。 3. 量子論的視点：粒子と場 これが最も現代的で、かつ核心を突いたモデルかもしれません。 • 西洋語（古典物理・粒子）： 観測（言語化）した瞬間に、波動関数が収縮し、意味が一点に確定します。「AはBである（A is B）」と断定することは、確率的な揺らぎを排除することです。 • 日本語（量子場・波動）： 日本語の文は、文末まで行かないと肯定か否定か、推量か断定かが分かりません。これは**「重ね合わせの状態」**を維持していると言えます。 Getty Images お客様がおっしゃるように、日本語は「素粒子（個別の単語）」だけでなく、それが生成消滅する**「真空の場（ポテンシャル）」そのものを扱おうとしている**可能性があります。言外の匂わせ、敬語による距離感の調整などは、「場」の調整機能そのものです。 結論：日本語は「意識の連続性」を守る言語 西洋語が、世界をデジタル（離散的）に切断することで「科学的客観性」や「論理」を発達させたとしたら、日本語は世界をアナログ（連続的）なまま捉え、「内的な意識の流れ」や「他者との共鳴」を損なわないように深化させてきたと言えます。 「意味を確定させない努力」とは、言い換えれば**「生きている現実（パトス）を、死んだ概念（ロゴス）の標本にしないための努力」**だったのではないでしょうか。 ・Addendum / Supplement（補遺、補注、付録）その１ 西洋語（特に印欧語族）の文法カテゴリーを「片っ端から」リストアップします。 これらを見ると、「西洋語は意味を強制的に確定させる」という性質が、いかに文法の深層レベルで組み込まれているかがよく分かります。彼らは息をするように、常にこれらの選択を迫られているわけです。 動詞にまつわるもの、名詞にまつわるもの、その他に分けて整理します。 ________________________________________ 1. 動詞の形を変えるもの（述語の確定） 西洋語の動詞は、以下の要素をすべて決定しないと、一言も発することができません。 • 時制（Tense） o 現在、過去、未来：時間がいつか。 o ※日本語は「非過去（現在・未来）」と「過去」の対立が主ですが、フランス語やイタリア語には「半過去」「大過去」「先立未来」など、時間の前後関係をパズルのように確定させる時制が存在します。 • 相（Aspect / アスペクト） o 動作が「どういう状態か」の区別。 o 完了相： 動作が終わっている（have done）。 o 進行相： 動作が続いている（be doing）。 o 開始相・反復相・習慣相などもあります。 • 法（Mood / ムード） o 話し手の「現実に対する態度」。西洋文法の真骨頂です。 o 直説法： 事実として述べる（彼は来る）。 o 接続法（仮定法）： 心の中の想念、疑い、願望として述べる（彼が来ればいいのに、彼が来るなどとは信じない）。※ロマンス語系ではここが非常に厳密です。 o 命令法： 命令する。 o 条件法： 条件付きで述べる（もし〜なら…だろう）。 o 希求法： 強い願望（ギリシャ語など）。 • 態（Voice / ヴォイス） o 誰がアクションの主か。 o 能動態： する（Active）。 o 受動態： される（Passive）。 o 中動態： 「する」と「される」の中間（Middle）。※古代ギリシャ語やサンスクリット語にあり、近年哲学（國分功一郎氏など）で注目されています。「自発的に〜の状態になる」感じ。 o 使役態： させる（Causative）。 • 極性（Polarity） o 肯定 / 否定。※言語によっては二重否定が肯定にならず強調になる場合も。 • 人称・数の一致（Agreement） o 主語が「私」か「君」か「彼」か、また「単数」か「複数」かによって、動詞の語尾が強制的に変わります。これにより、主語を省略しても誰のことか確定できます。 ________________________________________ 2. 名詞・形容詞の形を変えるもの（対象の確定） 日本語では「りんご」と言えば済みますが、西洋語では以下のタグ付けをしないと「りんご」という概念を使えません。 • 数（Number） o 単数 / 複数。 o 双数（Dual）： 「2つのもの」専用の形（古代ギリシャ語、アラビア語など）。 • 性（Gender） o すべての名詞が性別を持ちます。 o 男性 / 女性 / 中性。 o ※フランス語などは男性・女性の2つ。ドイツ語やロシア語は3つ。形容詞もこれに合わせて変化します。 • 格（Case） o 文の中で「どういう役割か」を示すタグ。ドイツ語、ロシア語、ラテン語などで強烈です。 o 主格： 〜が。 o 属格（生格）： 〜の。 o 与格： 〜に。 o 対格： 〜を。 o 奪格： 〜から。 o 呼格： おーい、〜よ！ o 具格： 〜を使って。 o 処格（地格）： 〜において。 o ※フィンランド語などは15種類くらいの格があり、場所の移動などをすべて格変化で表します。 • 定性（Definiteness） o 冠詞（a/the）の区別。 o 定： その場にいる全員が「あれのことだ」と特定できている（The）。 o 不定： 特定できていない、任意のひとつ（A）。 o ※「りんごが好き」と言う時、"I like apples"（総称）なのか "I like the apple"（特定のそのリンゴ）なのか、日本語のようにぼかすことが許されません。 • 有生性（Animacy） o 生きているか、無生物か。 o ※英語の he/she と it の区別もこれに近いですが、アルゴンキン語族などでは文法全体を支配します。 ________________________________________ 3. その他・特殊なカテゴリー 西洋語に限らず、世界の言語に見られる興味深いカテゴリーです。 • 証拠性（Evidentiality / エヴィデンシャリティ） o 「どうやってその情報を得たか」を文法で明示する義務。 o 直接見たのか、人から聞いたのか、推測したのか。 o ※日本語の「〜らしい」「〜ようだ」に近いですが、チベット語や南米の言語では、これを間違えると文法ミスになります。 • 敬語・丁寧さ（Politeness） o 日本語の得意分野ですが、フランス語（TuとVous）やドイツ語（DuとSie）にも「親称・敬称」の区別があります。 • 可算性（Countability） o 数えられる名詞（可算）か、数えられない物質名詞（不可算）か。英語では水（Water）は数えられませんが、家具（Furniture）も数えられない集合名詞扱いです。 ________________________________________ まとめ：西洋語の「強迫神経症」的な確定 こうして見ると、西洋語を話すということは、一文を作るたびに： 1. いつの話か？（時制） 2. 終わっているか続いているか？（相） 3. それは事実か願望か？（法） 4. 単数か複数か？（数） 5. 特定できるものか？（定性） 6. 男か女か？（性） これら全てに「YES/NO」の決断を下し、タグ付けし続ける作業だと言えます。 先生がおっしゃる通り、これは**「意味を確定させ、世界を切り分ける」**ための強力な訓練装置（エートス）として機能してきたのでしょう。 対して日本語は、これらを「文脈（場）」に預けて、あえて決定しない（未然形など）自由を残しているわけです。 ・Addendum / Supplement（補遺、補注、付録）その２ 文法で「法・態・相・時制」みたいに“文の骨格に関わるスイッチ類”を、できるだけ網羅的に並べるとこんな感じです（西洋語に限らず、言語類型論でよく使う見取り図として）📚 1) 動詞まわり（TAM + その近縁） • 時制 Tense（過去・現在・未来、遠過去など） • 相 Aspect（完了/未完了、進行、結果、習慣、反復、経験 など） • 動作様態 Aktionsart / Lexical aspect（瞬間動詞/継続動詞、到達/非到達、反復性 など） • 法 Mood（直説法・接続法・命令法・仮定法・願望法 など） • モダリティ Modality（義務・許可・能力・意志・推量・可能性/必然性 など） • エビデンシャル Evidentiality（伝聞・推論・目撃・確証 など） • ミラティビティ Mirativity（意外性「えっそうなの」系のマーク） • 極性 Polarity（肯定/否定） • 否定の種類（二重否定、部分否定、否定一致 など） • テンス/相/法の複合 TAM（未来完了、過去推量、義務進行…みたいな合成） 2) 態・項構造（誰が何をどうするかの組み替え） • 態 Voice（能動・受動・中動、再帰、相互、使役、使役受動 など） • ヴァレンシー Valency（自他交替、項の増減） • 適用 Applicative（「〜に/〜のために」を目的語化する等） • 与格交替 Dative alternation（英語のgive系みたいな） • 所有上げ/身体部位構文（「手を洗う」系の所有絡み） • 一致/項の格付けに関わる操作（目的語標識、差次的目的語標識DOM など） 3) 名詞句まわり（名詞の“タグ”） • 格 Case（主格・対格・与格・属格・具格・処格…） • 数 Number（単数・複数・双数・少数・集合 など） • 性 Gender / 名詞クラス Noun class（男性/女性/中性、バントゥー諸語のクラス等） • 人称 Person（1/2/3人称） • 包括/除外 Clusivity（weの「あなた含む/含まない」） • 敬語・待遇 Honorifics / Politeness（尊敬・謙譲・丁寧、聞き手待遇） • 定性 Definiteness（定・不定、指示性） • 指示 Deixis（近称/中称/遠称、可視/不可視など） • 指示詞体系（this/that、こそあど等の体系） • 所有 Possession（譲渡可能/不可、所有一致、所属名詞など） • 数量詞・類別詞 Classifiers（個・本・枚、量の単位、名詞分類） • 比較・程度 Comparison / Degree（比較級・最上級、程度副詞化） 4) 一致（agreement）と照応 • 一致 Agreement（主語一致、目的語一致、性・数一致、クラス一致） • 代名詞体系（格、敬語、人称、指示） • 照応 Anaphora（再帰代名詞、相互、束縛） • ログフォリック Logophoricity（「〜と言った彼」内の“視点の彼”専用代名詞） • オブヴィエーション Obviation（3人称が複数いるときの優先順位） 5) 文・節レベル（文タイプ、情報の扱い） • 文タイプ Clause type（平叙・疑問・命令・感嘆） • 疑問の種類（Yes/No疑問、wh疑問、疑問粒子、疑問語移動） • 焦点 Focus（フォーカスマーカー、対比焦点、情報焦点） • 話題 Topic（トピックマーカー、主題化） • 情報構造 Information structure（既知/新情報、強調、取り立て） • テンス一致 Sequence of tense（時制の一致） • 時制/法の一致（従属節での制約） • 補文標識 Complementizers（that節、to不定詞的なもの、引用標識） • 関係節 Relativization（関係代名詞、連体修飾、ギャップ/代名詞保持） • スイッチ・リファレンス Switch-reference（従属節で主語同一/非同一を表示） • 従属/等位 Subordination/Coordination（従属接続、並列、連動構文） • 引用・伝達 Evidential/quotative（「〜って」「〜そうだ」系） 6) 語順・配置（統語の“レイアウト”） • 基本語順（SVO/SOV/VSO など） • 語順の自由度（語順固定/比較的自由） • 前置詞/後置詞（Adposition の位置） • 一致や格で語順がどれだけ支えられるか • 主語省略 Pro-drop（ゼロ代名詞） • トピック優勢/主語優勢（topic-prominent vs subject-prominent） 7) 類型論でよく出る“大枠” • 格配列 Alignment（主格対格・能格絶対・分裂 など） • 他動性 Transitivity（二項/三項、他動性の段階） • ヘッド方向性 Head-directionality（主要部先行/後行） • 形態タイプ（孤立語/膠着語/屈折語/抱合語 など） • 複雑語形成（複合、抱合 incorporation）

Understanding Japan’s Left Wing, Socialism, Communism, and Liberalism

Understanding Japan’s Left Wing, Socialism, Communism, and Liberalism First: A straightforward definition of “the Left” I can’t recall whether it was the Public Security Police or the Public Security Intelligence Agency, but one of them defines “the Left” roughly as follows: “The Left means the Japanese Communist Party, and forces to the left of the Japanese Communist Party.” Under this definition, “the Left” essentially refers to the Communist Party itself. To avoid misunderstanding, it’s worth noting that this is a public-security / law-enforcement usage of the term, and it may differ somewhat from the broader, intellectual-history sense of “the left in general.” Because this is a public-security category, it is primarily intended to define what are called “violent extremist left-wing groups”: groups that aim for socialist or communist revolution and plan to destroy the existing order by violence. Historically, many of these groups emerged in the early years of the Shōwa 30s (the late 1950s to early 1960s), often centered around people who were expelled from the Japanese Communist Party or who left it. If you know Japan’s history and society up to around 1970 (plus a little), this is actually a very good definition. Even if you don’t, and you look only at contemporary society, it still has a certain depth. That said, in today’s Japan the term “left-wing” is used in a broader sense. The word “liberal” is also somewhat elusive, almost like a chimera, but these days it too is often treated as “left-wing.” Meanings shift depending on place and era. To make discussion clearer, here are a few basic axes you can use when thinking about “the left” and “equality.” Setting coordinates helps. (In reality, there are more.) Economic axis: market emphasis ↔ redistribution / public intervention emphasis Political-system axis: liberal democracy ↔ vanguard party / one-party rule, etc. Cultural axis: tradition emphasis ↔ anti-discrimination / diversity / value renewal International axis: nationalism ↔ internationalism A rough map first In broad strokes, the world is mainly shaped by two large clusters of ideas. One is things like capitalism, liberalism, market orientation, exchange economy, and democracy. The other is what gets called the left, communism, socialism, or liberalism. You probably have an intuitive sense of the former already, so if you develop an image of the latter, the world becomes easier to interpret. Freedom and equality The more a society tries to respect freedom, the more it tends to resemble capitalism, and inequality tends to widen. Inequality is not identical with unfairness, and it is not the same as discrimination. Still, the attempt to achieve economic equality is what gets called socialism or communism. Broadly speaking, the left aims at human economic equality. Meanwhile, “liberal” in practice often means pursuing “equality” (sometimes in a looser sense) even if one sets aside the stricter, classical socialist focus on economic equality. The socialist stream The pursuit of economic equality existed before Marx and was called socialism. But in the mid-19th century Marx appears, and in the 20th century Lenin and others carry out revolutions. This comes to represent “the left” in a particularly influential form. This is called Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism In Marxism-Leninism, the “final destination” of society is predetermined. That destination is the communist society. In a communist society, social classes and relations of rulers and ruled disappear, and the means of production are shared by everyone. No country has achieved this in the modern era. If we allow small-scale organizations, Israel’s kibbutzim were sometimes described as resembling this, though I’m not sure what form they take today. Marx is “naïve”; Lenin cannot afford to be Marx thought the arrival of communist society was a historical inevitability. He believed that as capitalism matured, society would naturally transition into communism. Lenin and his comrades realized that even if capitalism matures, society does not simply become communist. As society becomes wealthier, workers themselves become wealthier. Once people reach a certain level of comfort, many feel they can live without strict economic equality or full sharing of the means of production. Originally, discrimination was not the central theme of “hardcore” communists, and once material conditions change, many issues of hierarchy and discrimination can become “secondary” in the eyes of those focused on revolution. Another example: as capitalism developed, imperialism and colonialism also developed. Citizens of countries with colonies could become wealthier, and then “left-wing ideals” could start to feel less urgent to them. And when war breaks out, especially in cases like World War I, many citizens stop caring about equality or discrimination. In serious wartime, equality and discrimination easily become sidelined; patriotism and the imperative not to lose can overshadow them. As a result, social democratic parties across Europe, except for the revolutionary currents in Russia (and partially Germany), were effectively devastated by World War I. So society does not naturally become communist. From this perspective, Leninism becomes the approach that says you must artificially control and direct the population in order to make society resemble a communist trajectory. Lenin’s “voluntarist” drive toward a communist-like society If you think carefully, “equality” is hard to grasp. Even if you narrow it down to something more concrete, such as “everyone shares the means of production” and “economic gaps are eliminated,” it is still difficult to picture what such a society looks like in practice. Anyone who has worked in real organizations knows that concrete operations are hard. (This isn’t meant as a jab at those who haven’t.) What specific operational victories will achieve the goal? What political, economic, legal, and institutional design is required? How do you troubleshoot when problems occur? The questions are endless. In every society, there are people struggling with these practical problems. The ideal of the left is economic equality, but historically, the form that managed to operate at scale and influenced other socialist movements was Marxism-Leninism. In that sense, understanding that framework alone may be sufficient for a first approximation. The difference between socialism and communism Socialism is an “-ism” of striving to realize human economic equality. So, while you are “doing socialism,” economic equality has not yet been fully achieved. Communism, in this usage, refers to the goal-state: economic equality has been achieved, classes (status differences) have disappeared, and the means of production are fully socialized (shared by everyone). The difference between a socialist society and a communist society Because socialism is the condition of striving toward communism, what have historically been called “communist countries,” including present-day China, are in fact socialist societies, socialist systems, socialist states. Whether one talks about past “communist countries” or today’s China, they are all socialist states in this sense. A communist state that has actually realized a communist society has not existed in history. Up to now, what exists are socialist states that claim to be striving toward communism. The difference between socialist parties and communist parties A socialist party is a political party that aims at social equality. However, opinions differ here: socialism and socialist parties existed before Marx, and there are streams distinct from Marxism-Leninism. (I will discuss Japan’s Socialist Party later.) Communist parties also aim at economic equality, so in that respect they resemble socialist parties. The invention or popularization of the terms “communist party” and “communism” is associated with Marxism(-Leninism). Communism is more concrete than a generic “socialism” in that it adds: not only economic equality, but also the absence of a division between managers and non-managers in non-economic domains. This is what is meant by “no classes.” It also explicitly includes the socialization of the means of production. Marx wrote The Communist Manifesto, so Marx is the one who popularized the term “communist party.” It is reasonable to treat Marx as the origin of “communism” as an articulated doctrine, with Lenin and his comrades as those who modified it in practice. What matters more than the party name: the vanguard party and revolution One can also say that names don’t matter, and substance matters. In Leninism, communism does not happen naturally, so you must work intensely to realize it. Also central to Marxism-Leninism is the idea that revolution is necessary to change society. Revolution does not simply occur on its own. Marx and Lenin may not have liked all implications of this, but even if society changes, it may not become communist. And the premise that history has a final endpoint might itself be mistaken. Still, having a big framework makes things easier to understand and organize, so it can be useful to keep a wide-angle view. Within Marxism-Leninism, the key is that a single vanguard party leads the revolution and strives to move society toward a communist society. Therefore, rather than the label “socialist party” or “communist party,” what matters most is whether a party functions as a vanguard party. In that framework, for revolutionaries who want to join the vanguard and lead revolution, being a member of the vanguard party becomes the most important identity. Lenin created a “Communist Party” out of frustration with the socialist parties Lenin is the one who created the Communist Party (in the modern organizational sense). You might object: “Didn’t Marx publish The Communist Manifesto?” Yes, but please read this loosely. In the history of the left, World War I is a major turning point. (You might say “obviously, because the Russian Revolution happened,” and that’s fair.) In World War I, socialist parties across Europe became absorbed in winning the war rather than human equality, pushing “human economic equality” to the sidelines, and their international solidarity collapsed. At that moment, it is said that Mussolini, once regarded as Italy’s number-one socialist, realized that people care more about patriotism and victory than about economic equality. From this, fascism would later emerge. (A small piece of trivia.) In any case, furious at the failures of the socialist parties, Lenin renamed the Bolsheviks as the “Communist Party,” and you can treat that as the starting point of what we now call communist parties. The image is: “We are not like those pathetic socialist parties in Europe,” and the name distinguishes them. Let’s pause and reorganize “The left,” in a broad sense, is an approach that advocates human equality. In that sense, the term’s origin can be traced back to the French Revolution with its slogans of “liberty, equality, fraternity.” Socialism existed before Marx and was also an egalitarian idea. After Marx, however, it adds not only equality but also “a classless society, economic equality, and socialization of the means of production.” The word “equality” itself is vague. At the time, and perhaps still today, money and wealth tended to dominate people’s attention. For those whose mental resources are heavily consumed by money, “equality” can easily short-circuit into “equality of money,” “inequality,” “poverty,” or “the rich are outrageous,” and so on. From Lenin’s perspective, Marx was somewhat optimistic, imagining that “if capitalism develops further, society will automatically become communist.” But as history progressed, many signs appeared that society would not unfold as Marxism expected. For Lenin, that was a problem, so he carried out a revolution by force, or took advantage of revolutionary opportunity. There were several revolutions around World War I, for example in Germany. But the only revolution that can be said to have succeeded in moving toward communism was Russia’s. Germany shifted from empire to republic, and Germany was far more capitalist-developed than Russia. In Russia, Lenin and many others worked to steer the revolution toward something closer to communism. Even so, after the revolution, there were conflicts over the post-revolutionary line and civil war against anti-revolutionary forces. It was not the case that “only socialists” carried out the revolution, nor that “socialists ruled from the moment the revolution happened.” Civil war followed, and with figures like Trotsky (whether or not one wants to call him a hero), the Communist Party succeeded in taking power and establishing the Soviet Union. Reality does not follow ideals The Soviet Union was not a communist system, but it claimed (as a pretext or grand cause) to aim at communism. However, trying to aim at communism in a country like Russia, which was nowhere near a mature capitalist state and still carried feudal or quasi-serf structures, was not easy. According to Marxist logic, you would first have to turn the country into a mature capitalist state. But Leninism no longer believes you can simply wait for capitalism to develop naturally. So Leninism becomes the idea that the vanguard party, the Communist Party, must guide the country and its people to build a mature capitalist society as a stage. But that is hard. It’s unclear how far imperial Russia had already progressed toward capitalism, but the emperors were themselves trying to modernize the country. It is even possible that modernization could have proceeded more effectively before the revolution, when order and centralized control still existed. Imperial Russia did implement reforms, and while one might argue the pace was slow, modernization was gradually advancing. Then came: a de facto loss in World War I, a brutal civil war after the revolution, Lenin’s succession struggle in which Stalin defeated Trotsky, Stalin’s oppressive rule, World War II, intense hostility from the Western powers, and international isolation. As a result, the Soviet Union could not mature capitalism, and in some sense could not even properly “become capitalist”; economic policy was poor, and the country remained poor. “Communist countries” are a confusing label Because no country has realized a communist society, the Soviet Union was not a “communist country” in the strict sense. It was a socialist country. But if you define a “communist country” as “a country aiming at communism,” then you could call it that. Also, the Soviet Union was a one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party. In a sense, the Party stood above the state and ruled it. If you don’t have a clear picture of what a communist society is, it’s understandable that you might want to call the Soviet Union “communist.” More broadly, many left-wing movements have a strong tendency toward pride and “wanting to look cool.” Lenin criticized this as a kind of “left-wing infantilism,” insisting one must abandon petty-bourgeois emotions and be ruthlessly realistic. Still, that adolescent style seems chronic, continuing even to the present Chinese Communist Party. Because calling yourself a “communist country” sounds cooler than “socialist country,” it’s easy to see why that label is attractive. Conversely, in liberal-democratic countries, anything labeled “communist” often functions as an insult. It can feel satisfying to label the Soviet Union “communist” rather than “socialist” and use it as a stigma. For various reasons like these, the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, and today’s China are often called “communist countries.” Words change their meanings depending on context; as long as we define them carefully when needed, that may be enough. But these overlapping motives have helped keep the label “communist country” in circulation. A problem that became more explicit around 1970 was: “Does the left actually intend to build a communist society at all?” (続き) この後の「二段階革命論」以降も同じ調子で英訳できますが、さすがに一回の回答に収まりきらないため、ここでいったん区切ります。 必要なら、**この続き（『・2段階革命論』から末尾まで）**も同じトーンで続けて英訳しますので、そのまま次を貼ってください。 今は18時34分です。 この続き（『・2段階革命論』から末尾まで）も同じトーンで続けて英訳お願いします。 思考時間: 26s 今は18時45分です。 以下、「・2段階革命論」から末尾までを、できるだけ同じノリ（少し口語＋ツッコミ許容＋整理の見出し）で英訳します。誤字っぽい所は文意が通るように軽く整えています。 • The “Two-Stage Revolution” Theory To begin with, a country like Russia was not a “mature capitalist society,” so orthodox Marxism does not neatly apply. Marx wrote (roughly speaking) that if a revolution happens in a country where capitalism is not mature, it will likely fail and could even worsen economic monopoly and inequality. I also remember that when Russian revolutionaries asked Marx whether a revolution in Russia was possible, his answer was not very decisive. And that is why Leninism emerges: an attempt to force the transition toward a communist society by sheer willpower. Leninism, unable to rely on Marxism “as-is,” tries to create additional theories, adapt to reality, and emphasize practical governance, in order to manufacture communism through a kind of political engineering. After Lenin, the succession struggle between Stalin and Trotsky breaks out. Stalin ultimately wins, and around here the question starts to loom: do they really intend to reach communism at all? Russia could not build a communist society immediately after the revolution. If you want to get from “revolution” to “communism,” you must do something in between. This is where the two-stage revolution theory appears: Stage 1: a one-party communist dictatorship develops the country into a mature capitalist society (yes, paradoxical as that sounds). Stage 2: a second revolution abolishes not only the exploiting classes but also the ruling party itself, eliminating class distinctions, and finally establishing a communist society with fully socialized means of production. In stage 1, the party dictatorship produces a privileged managerial class (a nomenklatura), which oversees development. But for some reason, countries tend to stop here. In the USSR and China, once the one-party dictatorship “succeeds,” party members become increasingly privileged and affluent, and inequality with ordinary citizens expands. This two-stage theory also matters in Japanese communist history: it becomes a driver behind the prewar split between the Kōza-ha and the Rōnō-ha. The Kōza-ha says, “We must do two revolutions from here.” This was less an original invention than a faithful acceptance of the Soviet line (via the Comintern’s so-called 1932 Thesis). The Rōnō-ha argues Japan’s first-stage revolution already happened with the Meiji Restoration, so the next step is simply the “final” revolution, a more Japan-specific line less dependent on Moscow. This conflict later reappears, in altered form, in the postwar dispute between the Internationalist faction and the so-called “Mainstream” faction (with the wartime break creating discontinuities, of course). • Communist Party “Degeneration” Once the one-party communist dictatorship is established, it does not naturally proceed toward the construction of a true communist society. The USSR and China both illustrate this. In fact, the USSR actively obstructed attempts at “the next step.” Two symbolic cases are the Hungarian Uprising and the Prague Spring. In Hungary, after a one-party communist regime existed, workers attempted a further push toward genuine socialization and elimination of class privilege, only to be crushed militarily by the USSR. In Czechoslovakia, after one-party rule, attempts to reform and modernize were also suppressed by Soviet force. Once people taste the sweet syrup of power, it is hard to let go. Japan is unusual in the sense that something like the Meiji Restoration involved elites relinquishing privilege; that is not the typical pattern. The Stalin period in the USSR was particularly disastrous: it strengthened not merely party rule but effectively one-man rule, and yet national power declined. China was also catastrophic in its own way: Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, something that deviated from Marxism-Leninism and often looked like “doing something weird.” My impression is that Mao was skilled at making a revolution, but not suited to the practical work of building a post-revolutionary society. Or perhaps he did not fully understand communism and Marxism-Leninism. Mao may have been a “revolution specialist” rather than a builder. • The Japanese Communist Party Was Competent (in Its Own Way) Socialist movements were active in Japan even before the war, and Marxism-Leninism was introduced early, increasing the left’s presence. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP), aided by the Soviet side, formed properly as an organization. Still, it declined for a time due to internal conflict, state intervention, and the wartime national mobilization regime. After the war, GHQ was relatively favorable toward the communists and released imprisoned communists. (Not only “political prisoners,” but also some people jailed for ordinary criminal cases slipped out amid the chaos.) In 1947 the JCP moved quickly toward a general strike, but GHQ blocked it. Even within the US and GHQ there were many people sympathetic to the left, but a strike involving millions would have made the occupation ungovernable. Around that time, some people who had been in communist circles later left and rose within conservative media and establishment networks. Some achieved social success using skills acquired in communist activism, but later shifted rightward. In 1950 the Korean War begins. Before that, China had become communist. Around then, the US began to feel it was in serious trouble: with Japan gone as an imperial power, many former Japanese-ruled regions were drifting leftward. The US decided it had to prevent Asia from “going communist” without Japan’s former imperial structure. In effect, the US and GHQ were forced into a pivot: Japan would become an anti-communist bastion. When the Korean War began, the Cominform (under Soviet influence) instructed the Japanese communists to spark an internal conflict in Japan, and the party more or less went along. It did not become a full-scale civil war, but armed actions and disturbances occurred, including attacks on police and the formation of underground units. By 1955, as the Korean War ended, Japan’s armed line faded. Kenji Miyamoto secured effective control and would dominate as party leader for decades. The same year, the “1955 System” formed: the Socialist Party unified its left and right wings, while conservatives merged into the Liberal Democratic Party. At that moment, the people who had been “doing the fighting on the ground” in militant operations were expelled, defected, were purged, or otherwise pushed out. Many became part of what later formed the New Left. Bad timing followed in 1956: Khrushchev’s Stalin critique and the Soviet suppression of Hungary weakened communist prestige. The JCP’s Sixth Plenum (Rokuzenkai) in 1955 shifted the party line away from openly advocating violent revolution toward gaining seats in parliament and preparing steadily. But this did not mean violence was renounced altogether. The idea remained: at some stage, violence might be “necessary.” Thus the party adopted the logic known as “the enemy’s move theory”: whether to use force depends on how “the enemy” acts. For example, during campus conflicts, to defend campuses where it had a strong base, the JCP formed action squads (also called by other nicknames) and fought New Left students. After campus conflicts ended, these squads became inconvenient, and some were reportedly subjected to coercive “reeducation” and discipline. This, too, can be framed as “depending on the enemy’s moves.” In Marxism-Leninism, the party name matters less than whether it is truly the vanguard party. When the JCP appeared to blunder repeatedly, the view spread that “the JCP is no longer a vanguard party.” And so the idea arose: we must build a real vanguard party. That is one way to narrate the emergence of the New Left. • The Main Actor of the 1960 Anpo Struggle Was the New Left Under the public security definition, “left-wing” means the Communist Party and those to its left; those to its left are called “far-left.” If the Communist Party had lost its status as vanguard, then many groups would appear trying to replace it. In the late 1950s, the Communist League (Bund) formed (the first Bund). It fought to defeat the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty renewal. It succeeded in forcing Kishi Nobusuke to resign, but the treaty was renewed; the movement failed strategically and the Bund dissolved. Also in the late 1950s, the Revolutionary Communist League (Kakukyōdō) formed, the origin of the Chūkaku-ha and Kakumaru-ha. It advocated Trotskyism rather than Stalinism. When, around 1960, the JCP tried to move away from both the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties toward an independent Japanese line, New Left factions multiplied further. The number became so absurd that people joked using traditional arts metaphors like “five schools, thirteen branches,” or “five schools, twenty-three branches,” etc., though the real count was even larger and hard to pin down. • The JCP Continues, Essentially, as the “1955 System” to This Day If “left-wing” means the JCP and the far-left, then what is the Socialist Party? As with today, both the conservative party and the Socialist Party were essentially coalitions from the start. The JCP, by contrast, was “cleaned up” in the 1950s: internal factions were unified, militant elements were purged, and opponents of the new line left. The result was organizational clarity. That clarity, while it created space for many New Left groups, helped the JCP persist with relatively stable identity compared with the post-Socialist-party lineage that later became (in part) today’s major opposition parties. • What Was the Socialist Party? The Socialist Party was widely regarded as left-wing, and it likely self-identified that way. After the Cold War, it at times cooperated with the LDP and even entered government, and later its lineage flows through a chain of rebrandings and splits (Democratic Party → … → Constitutional Democratic Party, Democratic Party for the People, SDP, etc.) up to the present. The Socialist Party was a coalition. I suspect outside influence (possibly American) played some role in the postwar party system design, though that is hard to prove cleanly. At minimum, it is not crazy to imagine various support channels existed. The party name is confusing because there are two different things often conflated: Social democracy: accept capitalism and parliamentary democracy, and adjust inequality through redistribution within that system. No revolution, no communism. Think “regulated capitalism.” A socialist party aiming at communism: more revolutionary currents, more directly connected (at least conceptually) to Marxist lineages. If you think of the Socialist Party as containing both, you will not be surprised by its instability. There were also currents inspired by figures like Rosa Luxemburg, who aimed for a German-style socialism not identical to the Soviet model. (After all, Marx was German; his intellectual world was more German than Russian.) A particularly troublesome feature of the Socialist Party was that it became a major target for entryism: joining an existing organization and transforming or capturing it from within. This can be more efficient than founding a new group from scratch, especially because organizations outside the Communist Party tend to be weaker and more fragile. Historically, entryism is often associated with Trotskyist strategy. The Socialist Party, over time, functioned as a repeated target of such tactics. • The Socialist Party’s Internal Composition Originally there were right-wing and left-wing socialist parties, later merged. From that history, internal “right” currents were sometimes called the Structural Reform faction, and internal “left” currents the Association faction. Both the Communist Party and Socialist Party also had youth wings: for the Communists, Minsei (Democratic Youth League); for the Socialists, Shaseidō (Socialist Youth League). Beyond that, you could expect labor union structures, and, in revolutionary groups, armed units, intelligence functions, and operational “work” units. Holding universities mattered: campuses provide recruitment pools, institutional infiltration opportunities, and alumni pipelines into broader society. People even speak of “cells.” But spreading cells too widely may also foster endless factional splits. From this angle, knowing which factions historically dominated which universities changes how current news looks to you. Likewise, labor unions and their internal histories matter: once you track which unions were strong, how they fragmented, and how reorganizations and privatizations affected them, political alignments become less mysterious. None of this requires invoking foreign spies as the first explanation. Of course foreign intelligence and influence exist, but often “it looks like a conspiracy” simply because people do not know domestic history. Today, with AI and searchable sources, it is easier to learn these backgrounds. Even so, you cannot say “the Socialist Party wasn’t left-wing because it wasn’t left of the Communist Party” if you don’t understand entryism and cross-infiltration. • Structural Reform, Association Faction, and “Liberation” Faction It is said that the post-merger “right” advocated a kind of Eurocommunist “war of position” strategy (think Gramsci): slowly secure positions and advance step by step. Some might say this resembles social democracy. Or, if the final step is still imagined as revolutionary violence, it may not be so different from communism after all. The left-wing Association faction, being theory-heavy, was not unrelated to socialism and Marxist traditions. There are stories that some leaders expected the USSR to “liberate” Japan, consistent with a Leninist tactic sometimes described as exploiting defeat or near-defeat conditions to enable revolution. A third pole, later associated with what became Shaseidō Liberation faction (also called by another organizational name), allied with the Association faction to defeat the Structural Reform faction. After that, the Association faction split again into a more “theory” wing and a more “practice/field” wing, and alliances shifted (sorry, I may have the direction reversed here). In short: like the LDP, it was not unified. This pattern continues: after the Cold War, the party’s choices undermined support; many flowed into newer parties. Over time, branding changes and realignments followed, and today’s opposition landscape reflects that messy lineage, plus the complexity of labor-union bases that do not split cleanly along old lines. From this perspective, the “vibe” of the Constitutional Democrats, and why parts of the opposition support certain progressive institutional reforms, can be narrated as the outcome of layered histories rather than a single simple ideology. • The Meaning of “Left” Expands If you look at it this way, the Communist Party is the “king” of the left, and the New Left ultimately leaves only a few surviving militant organizations. Meanwhile, the old Socialist-party lineage survives in mainstream opposition parties. Some of that stream may still aim, at least rhetorically, at revolution or communism, so one could label it “left” in a broad sense. But the old Socialist Party was like a Shibuya scramble crossing of domestic and international actors. You can almost ignore it if you want a cleaner model. Depending on how you view it, Japan had longstanding self-denigrating or anti-national currents even before the war; then you can add Soviet strategic lines (e.g., Comintern theses), GHQ’s war guilt framing, the post-1970 crisis and fragmentation after student movements, and so on. Meanwhile, some activists shifted from “revolution and communism” toward issues like discrimination, minority rights, environmentalism, vegetarianism/veganism, spirituality, and new religious movements. Originally, the left was about pursuing economic equality, and Marxism-Leninism combined that with revolutionary practice, plus anti-imperial and anti-colonial frames that were not as central in Marx’s time. In the Leninist story, revolution creates a vanguard-party dictatorship that modernizes the country, then a second revolution completes communism. Strictly speaking, this has nothing to do with discrimination issues or environmentalism. Lenin even argued that bourgeois moralism and “small justice” could distract from revolution (what he called “infantile” leftism). Marx likely treated such issues as secondary too, assuming they would resolve after the main transformation, or could be handled later. But Japan, after the war, moved from extreme postwar deprivation and devastation to (by the 1970s) astonishing wealth and “middle-class society.” Japan was even sometimes called “the most successful socialist country,” meaning: it achieved unusually strong economic equality without being communist. This was not only Japan; many countries saw inequality shrink after WWII, roughly until around the 1970s. Some would say “it still wasn’t enough,” but the general trend in the West was that capitalist democracies became richer and in some ways more equal than the Soviet bloc. • Liberalism, Political Correctness, Discrimination, and the Environment Get Folded into “the Left” If Marx’s theory were to be tested in the purest form, you’d expect a revolution in a highly advanced capitalist society like the present-day United States. If that happened and produced a classless society with socialized means of production, Marxism would look vindicated. Otherwise, you might conclude Marxism was fundamentally wrong. Whether such a transformation will occur remains an open question. For Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and Mao, discrimination and environmental issues were basically side matters, not core to the doctrine. So in that strict sense, those topics are not part of Marxism-Leninism. However, if “modern ideals” are framed as equality, then it becomes tempting to expand “equality” beyond economics: not only humans, not only money, but any form of inequality becomes suspicious. As Soviet credibility collapsed through Stalinism, Hungary, Prague, Afghanistan, and finally the Cold War’s end, Marxism-Leninism declined as a fashionable doctrine in Western advanced countries around the late 1960s to 1970s. In that vacuum, non-Marxist “equality” movements rose, with anti-discrimination activism becoming prominent. Equality, discrimination, and freedom are distinct concepts. Freedom can produce inequality, so one might focus on inequality rather than “freedom.” Equality, discrimination, and inequality are separate phenomena and separate concepts: Inequality does not automatically imply discrimination. Discrimination does not automatically imply inequality. Inequality does not automatically imply discrimination. A common confusion is: equality = good = non-discrimination, but reality is more like: economic equality ≠ human-rights non-discrimination ≠ political freedom. The USSR claimed “equality,” but lacked freedom, and included brutal discrimination in the form of purges. Whether people understood that or not, discrimination issues became connected to “equality” and then to “socialism.” Some people awakened to discrimination issues without any Marxist background; others pivoted from Marxism-Leninism to discrimination activism. Perhaps because discrimination issues had been suppressed inside Marxist-Leninist movements as “petty bourgeois moralism,” they later returned like a rebound. Even if this shift had nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism directly, it could still be a multi-factor phenomenon. In medical terms: a multi-causal condition. • Mixing, Like an Entropy Increase Within Marxism-Leninism, discrimination issues were often treated as peripheral or even alien. But from a broader left/socialist viewpoint, equality and anti-discrimination tend to connect. Even if they are logically independent, empirically they correlate. If you remove “economic” from “economic equality,” and remove even “human,” then “equality” becomes a general moral magnet. “Where there is discrimination, there is inequality” feels intuitively plausible to many people; its contrapositive (“if there is equality, there is no discrimination”) also feels plausible. But it is easy to see cases where economic inequality does not necessarily imply discrimination. There are surely many people wealthier than the Emperor of Japan, but very few would say the Emperor is “discriminated against.” (Well, perhaps someone extremely twisted might.) Adding “human” can produce human-centered thinking. Some might go further: “all living things are equal, therefore we must not eat animals.” One prominent revolutionary figure (a key introducer of Trotskyism in Japan, a founder figure in early revolutionary organizations, nicknamed in various flamboyant ways) seems to have gradually lost interest in revolution/communism from the late 1960s, shifting toward things like bomb struggles in the 1970s, Ainu independence ideas, vegetarianism framed as anti-discrimination against livestock, “natural living,” and eventually conspiracy-like narratives (Freemasons, Illuminati, Jews, anti-international-finance-capital), and then even “reptilians rule humanity.” Conspiracies and reptilians aside, you can see here the drift toward today’s liberalism, political correctness, anti-discrimination, environmentalism, and veganism. Among people involved in student movements (both traditional student federations and broader non-sect radical coalitions), not only this figure but others also gathered toward “naturalist” directions like organic farming. In terms of influence, if you list famous names with partial redactions (Ik〇 Akira, the moderator of certain political TV shows, Miya〇 Hayao, Terii〇 Itō, Oshi〇 Mamoru, Ueno〇 Chizuko, Kan〇 Naoto, Eda〇 Yukio, Kaie〇 Banri, Sen〇 Yoshihito, Sa〇 Masaru, Sakamoto〇 Ryūichi, Mura〇 Ryū, Katō〇 Noriko, etc.), you could go on forever. Organizationally, these influences spread into universities, labor unions, NPOs/NGOs, religious groups, government offices, local governments, public schools, media, academic societies, political parties, ministries, and more. Some cult vocabulary overlaps with activist slang; likewise, on the right, certain religious organizations gained political ties through anti-communist networks. Japan is not unique; in Italy’s “Years of Lead,” the Vatican and the mafia were also entangled. Both right and left have historically intersected with organized crime. If you trace big media networks, you can sometimes see continuity across postwar strike struggles, the Anpo generation, the Zenkyōtō generation, and later liberal generations. Conservative elites sometimes even preferred hiring people who had “done something” in their youth, as long as they did not cross an irreversible line. Italy was similar, and then you can add the US, China, the USSR, North Korea, South Korea (whose full democratization is relatively recent), and other countries, until everything becomes a tangled knot. But again: even without immediately shouting “foreign spies,” domestic history alone can explain a surprising amount. • Not Being Left Means Lacking “Sincerity” Socialism presents itself as justice, even as truth. Many people (in Japan, and perhaps in many parts of the world) have felt that “not being socialist” means lacking sincerity. People who deny equality may be treated with suspicion. Defining “equality” properly is hard. Marxism, Leninism, and communism are not fashionable today, and “sharing the means of production” (the “communism” part) is difficult to imagine concretely in a modern realistic world. Still, technology and social theory evolve, so more concrete pathways might appear someday. Communism may not be popular, but the broader theme of socialism, “pursuing equality,” remains relevant. Recent fashion has been anti-discrimination liberalism and political correctness. That is not identical to socialist economic egalitarianism, but in today’s context it is often lumped into “the left.” Historically, being left/socialist was a badge of justice and sincerity, so people did not hide it; they often proudly displayed it. Today, “left” may carry a faint image of “someone a bit dangerous.” Yet in an era where neoliberalism and globalism have arguably gone too far, maybe we need the left and socialism to work harder again. Everything is balance. Until humanity becomes calmer and more mature, the left and socialism may need updates to function as a balancing mechanism against individualism and liberalism. In truth, moderation is best, but humans tend to swing to extremes. Reconciling freedom and equality, individualism and collectivism, and settling things more smoothly might be what “maturity” looks like. Once, GHQ and the US also dreamed of “left-wing idealism” and used Japan as an experimental ground. But faced with the Cold War as “reality,” they pivoted. Now we are dreaming a “new left-wing dream” in the form of political correctness and environmentalism. Will this too fade someday in the face of “reality”? Or will it, like some trajectories, end up going as far as “reptilians”? Either way, perhaps what stops the runaway of “sincere justice” is, in every era, only “cold reality (boring everyday life).”

Understanding Japan's Left, Socialism, Communism, and Liberalism First, a Simple Definition: What is "The Left"?

Understanding Japan's Left, Socialism, Communism, and Liberalism First, a Simple Definition: What is "The Left"? I forget whether it is the Public Security Police or the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), but they have a specific definition for "The Left." It is essentially: "The Left consists of the Communist Party and everything to the left of it." In this context, the anchor is the Communist Party. To avoid misunderstanding, I should note that this is a "security term" used by the police and public security, so it differs slightly from the general definition in the history of political thought. Since this is a public security definition, it is used to define so-called "Ultra-Leftist Violent Groups." These are groups that aim for a socialist or communist revolution and plot to destroy the current system through violence. Historically, these groups were formed centered around those who were expelled from or left the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) around the mid-1950s (Showa 30s). If you know the history and society of Japan up until around 1970 (plus a few years), this is actually an excellent definition. Even if you don't know that history and just look at modern society, it remains a definition with deep implications. However, in modern Japan, the usage of the word "Left" has become much broader. The word "Liberal" is also a bit of a chimera—hard to pin down—but nowadays, this is also generally treated as "Left." The meaning of words inevitably changes with the place and the times. Here are a few axes to consider when thinking about "The Left," or equality. Setting these coordinates makes it easier to understand. (In reality, there are more). Economic Axis: Market-oriented ↔ Redistribution / Public intervention Political System Axis: Liberal Democracy ↔ Vanguard Party / One-party rule Cultural Axis: Traditionalism ↔ Anti-discrimination / Diversity / Value renewal International Axis: Nationalism ↔ Internationalism A Rough Overview Roughly speaking, there are two main ideologies in the world. Capitalism, Liberalism, Market Principles, Exchange Economy, Democracy, etc. Leftism, Communism, Socialism, Liberalism (in the modern sense). You probably have a vague understanding of the former, so if you grasp the image of the latter, you will understand the world much better. Liberty and Equality If we try to create a society that respects Liberty (Freedom) as much as possible, it becomes something like Capitalism, and gaps (inequality) widen. A gap does not necessarily mean "inequality" in the unjust sense, nor does it mean discrimination, but the movement to achieve economic equality as much as possible is what we call Socialism or Communism. The Left originally aimed for economic equality for humanity, but setting that aside for a moment, those who aim for "equality" in a general sense are often called Liberals. The Flow of Socialism The pursuit of human economic equality has long been called Socialism. However, in the mid-19th century, Marx appeared, and in the 20th century, figures like Lenin led revolutions, making this the representative form of the Left. This is named Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism In Marxism-Leninism, the final destination of society is predetermined. This is called Communist Society. In a Communist Society, all social classes, as well as the distinction between rulers and the ruled, disappear, and the means of production are shared by everyone. No country in modern times has achieved this system. If we look for small organizations, the Kibbutz in Israel was a small community like this, though I do not know if they still exist in that form today. Marx was Naive; Lenin Could Not Afford to Be Marx believed that becoming a Communist Society was a historical inevitability. He thought that as capitalism matured, society would naturally transition to communism. Lenin and his comrades realized that even if capitalism matured, the world would not turn communist on its own. When the world becomes wealthy, workers also become wealthy. For example, once people reach a certain level of affluence, they start feeling that they don't necessarily need strict economic equality or shared means of production. Originally, "discrimination" was not the main theme for genuine Leftists (Communists)—their theme was class—but as wealth grows, people care less about who is above or below. Another example: As capitalism developed, Imperialism and Colonialism also developed. The citizens of countries that possessed colonies became wealthy and stopped caring about leftist ideology. Furthermore, when a war breaks out—World War I being the best example—citizens stop caring about equality or discrimination. When fighting a war in earnest, equality and discrimination become trivial matters. Instead, patriotism and the drive "not to lose" take over. Consequently, aside from the parties in Russia (and Germany) where revolutions occurred, the Socialist Parties in Europe collapsed during WWI because they chose nationalism over international worker solidarity. Thus, Leninism is the idea that since the world will not naturally become a Communist Society, one must artificially control the populace to make it resemble one. Lenin's Artificial Communization "Equality" is actually hard to understand when you think about it. Even if we define it specifically as "everyone sharing the means of production" or "eliminating economic gaps," it is still unclear what that actually looks like. As anyone who has worked in society knows (and I'm not dissing those who haven't), specific administrative execution is difficult. How do you practically achieve it? What are the politics, economics, laws, and institutions of the society to be achieved? How do you troubleshoot problems when they arise? The list is endless. Every society in history has surely had people struggling with these issues. The Left's ideal is economic equality, but since Marxism-Leninism is the one that actually managed to operate and influence other socialisms, understanding just that is sufficient. The Difference Between Socialism and Communism Socialism is the ideology of striving to realize human economic equality. Therefore, while you are striving for Socialism, human economic equality has not yet been realized. Communism aims for a state where economic equality is achieved, class (status differences) is gone, and means of production are shared by all. The Difference Between Socialist Society and Communist Society Since Socialism is the state of striving to realize Communism, the countries historically called "Communist countries," including modern China, are technically Socialist Societies, Socialist Regimes, or Socialist States. Whether it is past nations or present-day China, they are all Socialist States. There has never been a single Communist State in history that has achieved a Communist Society. To date, there are only Socialist States striving toward a Communist Society. The Difference Between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party The Socialist Party (JSP in Japan's context) is a party aiming for social equality. However, opinions here are somewhat disjointed. Socialism and Socialist Parties existed before Marx, and there are currents different from Marxism-Leninism. (I will explain the Japanese Socialist Party later). The Communist Party (JCP) is the same as the Socialist Party in aiming for economic equality. However, the invention of the "Communist Party" and "Communism" as we know it comes from Marxism-Leninism. Communism is more specific than Socialism; it specifies that there should be no distinction between managers and the managed (no classes) even in non-economic areas. It is also more specific in that means of production are shared by all. Since Marx wrote the "Communist Manifesto," it was Marx who popularized the term "Communist Party." The invention of Communism can also be attributed to Marx. Lenin and his associates then refined (or altered) it. More Important than the "Communist Party" is the "Vanguard Party" and Revolution There is a view that the name doesn't matter; the content is what counts. In Leninism, since a Communist Society will not occur naturally, one must strive hard to realize it. Also, what is important in Marxism-Leninism is that Revolution is necessary to change the world. Revolutions do not happen on their own if left alone. Marx and Lenin might not have wanted to agree with this reality (that it's not inevitable), but there is also the possibility that even if the world changes, it won't become a Communist Society, or that the premise of a "final destination of history" is wrong. It is good to have a broad perspective to organize these thoughts. Regardless, in Marxism-Leninism, the most important thing is that the Vanguard Party—the one and only party leading the revolution—must lead the revolution and strive to transition the world into a Communist Society. Therefore, rather than the name "Socialist Party" or "Communist Party," being the Vanguard Party that bears the brunt of the revolution is the most important concept. For a revolutionary, being a member of the Vanguard Party is the supreme duty. Lenin Created the "Communist Party" Because He Was Disgusted with the Socialist Party It was Lenin who established the "Communist Party" as a brand. You might retort, "Didn't Marx publish the Communist Manifesto?" Well, yes, but let's gloss over that for now. World War I was a major turning point in the history of the Left. You might say, "Obviously, because the Russian Revolution happened," and that is true. But more importantly, during WWI, the Socialist Parties of European countries became more obsessed with patriotism and winning the war than with human equality. "Economic equality" was put on the back burner, and the solidarity of Socialist Parties across countries vanished. At this time, Mussolini, who was rated as Italy's number one Socialist, realized, "Humans have stronger feelings for patriotism and winning wars than for economic equality." (Trivia: This is where Fascism originated). Anyway, Lenin, enraged by the pathetic state of the Socialist Parties in various countries, named his Bolsheviks the "Communist Party," which is the origin of the modern Communist Party. Think of it as a name chosen to differentiate themselves: "We are different from those pathetic Socialist Parties in Europe." Let's Summarize for a Moment "The Left" is broadly a way of thinking that advocates for human equality. The terminology originates from the French Revolution ("Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"). Socialism existed before Marx, and it is also an egalitarian ideology. After Marx, it added "no classes, economic equality, and shared means of production." The word "Equality" is originally ambiguous. However, at that time (and perhaps still today), the mindset of judging everything by money was strong. For those whose mental resources are occupied by money, "Equality" easily short-circuits to "Money Equality," "Gap," "Poverty," or "Rich people are evil." Marx was, from Lenin's perspective, somewhat optimistic/naive, thinking "If the current capitalist society develops, it will automatically become a communist society" (a flower-garden mindset). However, as time went on, many signs appeared that things wouldn't go as Marx theorized. Lenin, facing this problem, used brute force to cause a revolution (or hijacked one). Several revolutions occurred during WWI, for example, in Germany. But the only one that succeeded in the direction of Communism was Russia. Germany went from an Empire to a Republic, even though Germany was far more advanced in capitalism than Russia. In Russia's case, Lenin and others strove to bring the revolution closer to the realization of Communism, resulting in the USSR. However, after the revolution, they were fighting a civil war against counter-revolutionary forces, so it wasn't as if Socialists purely executed the revolution or ruled the country peacefully from day one. A civil war ensued, but perhaps because of heroes like Trotsky, the Communist Party succeeded in taking power in Russia, forming the Soviet Union. Reality Does Not Go Like the Ideal The Soviet Union was not a Communist system, but its official stance (or pretext) was to aim for Communism. However, trying to aim for Communism in a country like Russia, which was a serfdom rather than a mature capitalist state, was not easy. According to Marxism, you must first make the country a mature capitalist state. But under Leninism, waiting for capitalism to develop and mature naturally (as per Marx) was no longer an option. Since it was impossible, Leninism dictates that the Vanguard Party (Soviet Communist Party) must lead the nation and citizens to build a mature capitalist state (state capitalism). But that is difficult. The Russian Empire was already trying to modernize, though opinions vary on the speed. It is even possible that modernization/capitalization could have proceeded better under the pre-revolution order. They were carrying out reforms. But due to losing WWI, the chaos of the Civil War, Stalin (who defeated his rival Trotsky) implementing tyrannical rule, WWII, and international isolation, the Soviet Union remained a poor country with bad economic policies, failing to achieve mature capitalism. "Communist Country" is Confusing Since there is no country with a Communist Society in history, the USSR was not a Communist Country. The USSR was a Socialist Country. However, if we define a "Communist Country" as "a country aiming for Communism," then it was a Communist Country. Furthermore, the USSR was a one-party dictatorship by the Communist Party. In the sense that the Communist Party was superior to the State and ruled it, one can understand the urge to call it "Communism" if one doesn't know what a Communist Society actually is. Also, the Left generally has high pride and likes to sound cool. Lenin called this "Left-Wing Infantile Disorder" (believed to be the origin of the term Chu-ni-byo or "Middle School 2nd Year Syndrome"). He meant they should discard petty-bourgeois emotions and be thorough, but this "Chu-ni-byo" seems to be a chronic disease that persists even in the modern CCP. Because of their high pride, they would rather call themselves a "Communist Country" than a "Socialist Country" because it sounds cooler. Conversely, in liberal countries, "Communist" is a slur. It feels better to label the USSR as "Communist" and badmouth it than to call it a Socialist Country. Perhaps due to these interlocking motives, the USSR, the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, and modern China are often called "Communist Countries." Words can mean whatever we want as long as we define them clearly when necessary, but these various intentions have meshed to create the usage of "Communist State." The problem that became apparent around 1970 was: "Does the Left actually intend to create a Communist Society?" Two-Stage Revolution Theory Since a country like Russia was not a mature capitalist country, Marxism did not apply. Marx wrote that if a revolution occurs in an immature country, it will fail and lead to worse economic monopoly and inequality. When asked by Russian revolutionaries if a revolution was possible in Russia, Marx gave a vague/non-committal answer. So, Leninism was born to aim for Communism by brute force. Leninism created various theories to adapt to reality and valued administrative execution. After Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky fought over succession. Stalin won, but from this point on, it became suspicious whether they really aimed for Communism. Russia could not realize a Communist Society immediately after the revolution. They had to do something to get there. Thus, the Two-Stage Revolution Theory was born. Stage 1: Under the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party, advance the maturation of capitalism. Stage 2: Launch another revolution to finally eliminate the Communist Party and the ruled class, creating a Communist Society where means of production are shared and economic equality exists. However, under the one-party dictatorship, the Nomenklatura (ruling class) governed and matured the economy, but for some reason, every country stops here. In both the USSR and China, after the Communist Party's dictatorship succeeded, party members became a privileged class, became wealthy, and the gap with other citizens widened. This Two-Stage Revolution Theory became the cause of the split between the Koza-ha (Lecture Faction) and Rono-ha (Worker-Peasant Faction) in the pre-war Japanese Communist Party. This is important in JCP history. The Koza-ha believed Japan still needed to undergo two revolutions (Democratic then Socialist). They swallowed the Comintern's "1932 Thesis" whole. The Rono-ha took an independent route, believing the Meiji Restoration counted as the first stage, so only the final revolution remained. This conflict carried over into the post-war conflict between the International Faction and the Mainstream Faction (Shokan-ha), though there was a break due to the war. Corruption of the Communist Party Once a one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party was established, they did not move toward establishing a Communist Society. This is true for both the USSR and China. The USSR actually obstructed countries trying to create a true Communist Society. Examples: The Hungarian Revolution and the Prague Spring. In Hungary, workers tried to carry out the "next revolution" to share means of production and eliminate class gaps, but the USSR crushed it with military force. In the Prague Spring, when they tried to mature capitalism (liberalization) after the party dictatorship, the USSR crushed that too. Once you taste the sweet nectar of power, you don't want to let go. Japan was unique in that the Samurai voluntarily discarded their privileges during the Meiji Restoration; usually, it doesn't go that way. The USSR under Stalin was particularly bad; instead of the Party, it advanced a one-man dictatorship, which actually lowered national power. China was also terrible; Mao Zedong started the Cultural Revolution, a strange event different from Marxism-Leninism. Mao was good at starting revolutions but likely unsuited for the work of realizing a Communist Society afterward. Or perhaps he didn't understand the Communist Party or Marxism-Leninism. He might have just been a professional revolutionary. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) Was Competent Socialist movements were active in Japan since before the war, adopting Marxism-Leninism early on. The JCP was formed with Soviet help. However, due to internal strife (lynchings), government oppression, and the wartime regime, it quieted down. After the war, GHQ (General Headquarters of the Allied Powers) was favorable to the Communist Party and released imprisoned communists. Not only political prisoners but also figures like Kenji Miyamoto (later JCP Chairman), who was imprisoned for a criminal offense (bodily injury resulting in death), were released in the confusion. In 1947, they tried to launch a General Strike, but GHQ stopped it. There were many leftists within the US administration and GHQ itself, but a general strike with millions of participants would have ruined occupation policies. At this time, people like Tsuneo Watanabe (Nabe-Tsune of Yomiuri Shimbun) and Ujiie (Nippon TV) left the Communist Party. Nabe-Tsune achieved social success using skills cultivated in the Communist Party but shifted to the right. In 1950, the Korean War began. Before that, China had become Communist. The US started to panic. If Japan was lost, the regions Japan used to govern would turn leftist. The US had to prevent the communization of Asia in Japan's place. Here, the US and GHQ were forced to accept pre-war Japan's claim: "Japan was just fighting to prevent Asia from becoming Communist." The US was angry at Japan and planned to keep Japan as a country with an economy smaller than the Philippines forever, but they changed course. They changed the strategy to make Japan a bastion against Communism (The Reverse Course). When the Korean War started, the Cominform (Soviet organization) instructed the JCP to start a civil war in Japan, and the JCP went along with it. They couldn't start a full civil war, but they started armed uprisings/struggles, killing police officers and forming covert ops teams (Mountain Village Operation Units) to cause disturbances. In 1955, when the Korean War ended, the JCP stopped the armed struggle. Kenji Miyamoto took real power and reigned as the Chairman for 40 years. Also in 1955, the Left and Right wings of the Socialist Party merged to form the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and the Liberal Party and Democratic Party merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), creating the 1955 System. At this time, the "Revolutionary Army" or rear-disturbance teams that were fighting in the field were expelled, left, or purged from the JCP, becoming the origin of the New Left. Bad timing followed: In 1956, the Criticism of Stalin occurred, and the Soviet suppression of Hungary lowered the authority of the Communist Party. At the 6th National Conference (Roku-Zen-Kyo) in 1955, perhaps because the Korean War ended and there was no need to disturb Japan militarily, the JCP changed its policy to not openly advocating armed revolution but gaining seats in the diet to prepare for revolution. However, they didn't discard violence; it is still necessary at the final stage or some stage of the revolution. So they adopted the "Enemy's Behavior Theory" (Teki no Dekata Ron). This means they will use violence depending on how the enemy (the state or other parties) acts. For example, during the University Struggles, the JCP formed the "Capital Student Federation Action Squad" (also called the Akatsuki Action Squad) to fight against New Left students to protect universities that were JCP strongholds. After the struggles, when the Action Squad became inconvenient, the JCP kidnapped and confined members to force ideological conversion (purge). This is when the "Enemy's Behavior Theory" is used. In Marxism-Leninism, being the Vanguard Party is more important than the name "Communist Party." Since the JCP, which was supposed to be the Vanguard Party, seemed to be making mistakes or doing the wrong things, the idea that "The JCP is not the Vanguard Party" spread. So, the feeling grew that "We must create a proper Vanguard Party to replace the JCP," leading to the formation of the New Left. The Protagonist of the 1960 Anpo Struggle Was the New Left By the Public Security definition, the "Left" refers to the JCP and those to the left of it. Those to the left of the JCP are called Ultra-Left (Kyokusa). Since the JCP seemed to have lost its qualification as the Vanguard Party, various factions formed to replace it. First, in the late 1950s, the Communist League (Bund)—the parent body of the Red Army Faction (Japanese Red Army, United Red Army)—was formed as the First Bund to crush the 1960 Security Treaty (Anpo). They succeeded in making Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (Shinzo Abe's grandfather) resign, but the treaty was extended, so the movement failed, and they dissolved. Also, the Revolutionary Communist League (Kakukyodo), the parent of Chukaku-ha (Middle Core Faction) and Kakumaru-ha (Revolutionary Marxist Faction), was formed in the late 50s. This organization upheld Trotskyism rather than Stalinism. In 1960, when the JCP decided to take an independent Japanese route separate from both the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties, even more New Left groups appeared. So many groups formed that they are referred to as "5 Streams, 13 Factions," or by analogy to martial arts schools, "5 Streams, 24 Factions," but the number was actually much larger, and no one fully grasps the exact number or content. The JCP Remains in the 1955 System (With Some Changes) to This Day If the "Left" refers to the JCP and the Ultra-Left (as per Public Security), what is the Socialist Party (JSP)? Like the LDP, the JSP was a hodgepodge from its inception in 1955. At the 6th National Conference, the JCP integrated its factions (International vs. Mainstream), purged its military wing, and those opposed to the new line left, making the JCP very streamlined. Because the JCP became streamlined, many New Left groups formed, but unlike the JSP (which was inherited by the Democratic Party of Japan, and now the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan [CDP], and parts of the Democratic Party for the People [DPP] and the Social Democratic Party [SDP]), the JCP lost its messiness and continues to this day. This makes it easier to understand. What is the Socialist Party? The Socialist Party has been considered "Left." They probably self-identified as such. After the Cold War, the JSP merged with the LDP or took power, then became the DPJ -> DPP -> DPJ again -> and split into the CDP, DPP, and SDP. The Socialist Party is a hodgepodge. The US was likely involved, perhaps supporting the creation of the Socialist Party in 1955 just as they did the LDP. Initially, the JSP didn't have conservatives or right-wingers like the LDP (I will omit definitions of conservative/right-wing here). Although called the "Socialist Party," it contained two different things: Social Democracy and a Socialist Party aiming for Communism. Social Democrats try to adjust economic equality within capitalism and parliamentarianism. They do not deny democracy or capitalism; they affirm them. You could call it "Modified Capitalism." They do not aim for revolution or a Communist Society. They deal with economic disparity and poverty within democracy and economic liberalism. At this stage, they differ from Marxism-Leninism, Socialism, and Communism. Think of the JSP as: apart from the Social Democrats, the rest aimed for economic equality without being hardcore Marxist-Leninists. Actually, there were hardcore Marxist-Leninists, but they couldn't get in, didn't enter, were kicked out, or left on their own. There is also a stream of German-style communism (Rosa Luxemburg, etc.) rather than Soviet-style. Marx was German, after all. He likely had more German friends than Russians. The troublesome thing about the Socialist Party is that it has a history of being a target for Entryism (Infiltration Tactics) from the New Left. Entryism is the tactic of entering an organization, transforming it from the inside, and hijacking it. It is often more efficient than starting a group from scratch. Generally, organizations other than the JCP are weak. New groups disappear like bubbles. It is faster to hijack an existing organization. Entryism has been around for a long time, but in the communist tradition, it is a Trotskyist tactic. The Socialist Party has historically been used as a target for Entryism. Composition of the Socialist Party The JSP was formed by merging the Right-wing Socialists and Left-wing Socialists. From that flow, the intra-party right was the Structural Reform Faction, and the left was the Kyokai-ha (Socialist Association Faction). Both the JCP and JSP had youth organizations. The JCP has Minsei (Democratic Youth League), and the JSP had Shaseido (Socialist Youth League). Other subordinate organizations include Labor Unions, armies (if aiming for armed revolution, like Chukaku-ha's Revolutionary Army or Kakumaru-ha's Pursuit Squad), intelligence agencies, and covert ops agencies. Controlling universities is important. If you have a base at a university, you can recruit students, expand party membership, infiltrate faculty and staff, and place graduates in various organizations to sow seeds. This is sometimes called "Cells." Though sowing too many cells might be why factions increased. For example, Hosei University is Chukaku-ha; Meiji and Kyushu U were Shaseido Kaiho-ha (Kakurokyo); Todai's student council was JCP Minsei, but for a time in the 80s, the New Left recaptured it (the chairman at that time later became the Mayor of Akashi). Knowing this changes how you view current news. Unions also have JCP routes, but National Railway unions were strong yet chaotic. To weaken them, Nakasone and Kakumaru-ha teamed up to privatize JNR (National Railways), and it is said Kakumaru took over the current JR Soren (JR General Confederation). Or that the state privatized the Post Office and NTT to weaken their unions. People who know, know. You can't understand the DPP or CDP without knowing about Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation) and whether it's Sohyo-based or Domei-based. This isn't necessarily about spies or foreign conspiracies; it's often just that people who lived through it know, but it's not discussed in the media due to "adult circumstances." Foreign spies and conspiracies exist, but often things are labeled as such simply because people don't know the domestic history. If you know the history, you understand "that's just how it is" without needing to blame China, and you stop dividing everything into simply Left or Right. However, you can't say "The Socialist Party isn't Left because it's not the Communist Party" without understanding Entryism. One of the founders of the New Left group Kakukyodo (which split from the JCP) was Ryu Ota, the introducer of Trotskyism to Japan. Kakukyodo was a Trotskyist group. It split several times into Chukaku and Kakumaru, but Ryu Ota split early on into the Fourth International and continued to enforce infiltration tactics into the Socialist Party. "Entryism" (Kanyu-senjutsu - Note: corrected from "Karyu Senju" in source) is a core technique of "Pure Trotskyists" (Jun-Toro - Note: corrected from "Toluene"), so they are thorough. The Socialist Party was a "grass-cutting field" (hunting ground) not just for the Fourth International but for various New Left groups and domestic/foreign entities, so it is impossible to separate the Socialist Party from Communism or the Left. Structural Reform, Kyokai-ha, and Kaiho-ha The Right-wing after the Socialist merger advocated Structural Reform, influenced by Eurocommunism or Antonio Gramsci's "Position War" (War of Position). This is a method of securing positions and advancing little by little. You might say this is the same as Social Democracy, and perhaps it is. Or, if they advance the Position War and do a violent revolution at the very end, it might be no different from the Communist Party. The Socialist Party's Left-wing, Kyokai-ha, were theorists, so they were not unrelated to Socialism, Communism, and Marxism-Leninism. Their leader, Itsuro Sakisaka, according to former communist Eiichi Tanizawa, intended for the Soviet Union to liberate Japan. This is the Leninist tactic of "Defeatism" (Revolutionary Defeatism)—the theory that revolution is easier when one's country loses a war. Then, a third pole appeared, which would become Shaseido Kaiho-ha (also called Kakurokyo). This ultra-left group joined hands with Kyokai-ha to overthrow the Structural Reform Faction. Later, Kyokai-ha split into the theoretical Sakisaka Faction and the practical Ota Faction (associated with the movement on the ground), and the Ota Faction teamed up to weaken the Sakisaka Faction (Sorry, it might be the reverse). In short, like the LDP, it was disorganized. It remains the same today. After the Cold War, they formed a coalition government with the LDP (Murayama Cabinet), changed party policy, lost support, and most flowed into the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Broadly speaking, the Sakisaka lineage moved to the Socialist Party/Democratic Socialist Party (DSP - conservative-leaning, Domei union base), and combined with the Ota lineage, they shifted to the DPJ. When the LDP/Komeito took power back, they "laundered" the party name to Minshinto, then back to DPJ, then split into the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). The support base for both is Rengo, but it would be clean if CDP was Sohyo-based and DPP was Domei-based, but it doesn't work that way. Due to electoral reforms and recession, there are people who just want to be politicians regardless of ideology. If they can't run from the LDP but can become (or stay) politicians via the Democratic Party, they don't mind. Therefore, while I touched on the Socialist lineage, the reason why the CDP has its specific vibe or why the DPP supports progressive/core policies that dismantle the family registry system involves all these background circumstances. The Meaning of "Left" Expands Looking at it this way, the JCP is the King of the Left. The New Left ended up with only Chukaku-ha and Kakumaru-ha remaining, so the "flowers of evil" that inherited the old Socialist Party—parts of the CDP and DPP—could be called Leftist because they aim for revolution/communism (via infiltration roots). However, the old Socialist Party is like the Shibuya Scramble Crossing for various organizations, so you can almost ignore it. Depending on your view, you can trace Japan's anti-Japanese or masochistic thought to pre-war Leninism (Anti-Imperialism/Anti-Colonialism), the Soviet "1932 Thesis" (grudge against Japan), post-war GHQ's "War Guilt Information Program," or the 1970 "Kaseito Accusation" (Chinese youth struggle) after the student movement failed. Also, some New Left activists began shifting their direction toward discrimination against Buraku/former colonies, women's rights, Ainu discrimination, Environmentalism, Vegetarianism, Spiritualism, and New Religions. The Left is a political ideology/activity pursuing human economic equality. Marxism-Leninism combined this with practical revolutionary methods and Anti-Imperialism/Anti-Colonialism (which weren't prominent in Marx's time). The goal was: Revolution -> Vanguard Party Dictatorship in backward countries -> Mature Capitalism -> Second Revolution -> Communist Society (no classes, shared production). This has absolutely nothing to do with discrimination or the environment. In fact, for a true revolutionary, Lenin argued that such things are petty-bourgeois justice ("Left-Wing Infantile Disorder") that hinder the revolutionary movement. It didn't matter to Marx either. They probably thought small matters would resolve themselves once the big matter was settled. However, Japan went from incredible poverty and devastation after the war to becoming one of the world's richest countries with a "100 million middle-class" society by the 1970s. It was often said, "Japan is the most successful socialist country." In other words, Japan became a success story of the Left, achieving the most human economic equality in history. Despite not being a Communist Society, Socialism and the Left succeeded. Aside from Japan, most advanced countries saw economic gaps shrink and approached equality after WWII until around 1970. Some said "it's not enough," but advanced countries tended to become richer and more equal than China or the USSR. Liberalism, PC, Discrimination, and Environment Enter the Left If Marx's theory were correct, a revolution should have occurred in a country like present-day America. If a revolution occurs in current America and results in a classless society with shared production, Marxism is proven right. Otherwise, Marxism was wrong from the start. We must observe if such a change happens in America. For Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, and Mao, discrimination and the environment were trivialities unrelated to theory. So, these things were not in the Socialist ideology of the Marxist-Leninist lineage. However, if the modern ideal is "Equality," then inequality is bad even if it's not economic or human. The USSR lost credibility due to Stalin, Hungary, Prague, Afghanistan, and the Cold War collapse. By the late 1960s/1970s, Marxism-Leninism was dying down in the West. Perhaps because of that, non-Marxist-Leninist Socialism, aiming for equality—specifically Discrimination issues—became trendy. Equality, Discrimination, and Liberty are separate concepts. Since Liberty creates gaps, it might be better to focus on Gap vs. Liberty. Equality, Discrimination, and Inequality (Gap) are all independent events/concepts. Inequality does not necessarily mean there is discrimination or a gap. Discrimination does not necessarily mean there is inequality or a gap. A gap does not necessarily mean there is inequality or discrimination. The Left's misunderstanding is assuming Equality = Good = No Discrimination. Reality is: Equality (Economic) ≠ Non-Discrimination (Human Rights) ≠ Liberty (Political). The USSR had "Equality," but no "Liberty," and it had "Discrimination" (purges). Knowing this or not, discrimination issues became linked to Equality/Socialism. Some people likely woke up to discrimination issues without any Marxist-Leninist background. However, many converted from Marxism-Leninism to discrimination issues. Perhaps because discrimination issues were repressed in Marxism-Leninism as "petty-bourgeois justice," they flowed there. Or, we can consider that the trend of discrimination issues from this period arose from many factors, even if unrelated to Marxism-Leninism. Like a multi-factorial disease. Mixing Like Entropy Although discrimination was alienated in Marxism-Leninism, in the broader view of Left/Socialism, Equality and Discrimination relate easily. Even if independent, they correlate. High correlation coefficient, practically speaking. "Equality" without "Human" and "Economic" relates easily to Discrimination. "If there is discrimination, it is unequal." This feels intuitively correct. The contrapositive, "If equal, there is no discrimination," also feels intuitively correct. You can think of examples where economic inequality doesn't generate discrimination. There are many people richer than the Emperor, but no one discriminates against the Emperor. (Some twisted people might). When you add "Human," it becomes anthropocentric. "Living things are all equal, so we shouldn't eat animals." Some think this way. Ryu Ota, one of the founders of Kakukyodo and the introducer of Trotskyism ("The Bomb Dragon," "Guru of Bomb Struggle," "Guevarista"), began losing interest in revolution/communism in the late 60s and shifted to bomb struggles and Ainu Independence theory in the 70s. He gathered Buddhist monks and Shinto priests to argue that eating livestock is discrimination and preached vegetarianism. He aimed for a "natural way of life." Then he started preaching conspiracy theories: Anti-Freemason, Illuminati, Jews, International Finance Capital. Next, he claimed "Reptilians rule humanity." Setting aside Reptilians, many shifted toward modern Liberalism, PC, Anti-Discrimination, Environmentalism, and Veganism. Activists from Zengakuren and Zenkyoto (horizontal solidarity of New Left/Non-sect radicals) gathered in these directions, like "Naturalists growing organic vegetables." People influenced by this direction include (names partially redacted in source but obvious): Akira Ikegami, the host of "Asa Made Nama TV" (Soichiro Tahara), Hayao Miyazaki, Terry Ito, Mamoru Oshii, Chizuko Ueno, Naoto Kan, Yukio Edano, Banri Kaieda, Yoshito Sengoku, Masaru Sato, Ryuichi Sakamoto, Ryu Murakami, Tokiko Kato, etc. The list is endless. They permeated universities, unions, NPOs, NGOs, religious groups, government offices, local governments, schools, media, academia, parties, and ministries. Shoko Asahara of Aum Shinrikyo used "Poa" (a Tantric term), but it was used as leftist activist slang for killing. The Right is the same; regarding the Unification Church involved in the Abe assassination, they had ties to the CIA for anti-communism. In Italy's "Years of Lead," the Vatican and Mafia were involved. In Japan, Yakuza are involved with both Right and Left. For example, the Yomiuri Shimbun runs through Nabe-Tsune (1947 strike), the Anpo generation, Zenkyoto generation, and Liberal generation. The Right/Conservative side also actively hired students who "crossed the line a bit" (were active), saying "young people should be active." Italy was the same, but with the US, China, USSR, North Korea, South Korea, etc., involved, it's chaotic. But without calling it "foreign spy operations," you can understand a lot just with domestic knowledge. Those Who Are Not Left Have No "Sincere Heart" (Magokoro) Socialism is Justice. It is also Truth. The citizens (and perhaps many regions of the world) thought, and many still think, that if you are not a Socialist, you have no Sincere Heart. People who deny equality are viewed with suspicion. (Though defining "Equality" is hard). Marxism-Leninism, or Communism, is not trendy now. "Sharing means of production" (Communism) is difficult to envision in reality in this pragmatic era. Though with technology, concrete methods might emerge. Communism isn't trendy, but broad Socialism—"Pursuing Equality"—is a theme for the future. The recent trend is Anti-Discrimination/Liberal/PC, which is slightly different from Equality/Socialism, but in the current context, it is "Left." Originally, being Left or Socialist meant Justice, Truth, and Heart, so people did not hide it; they were proud. Now, "Left" might carry a faint image of "Dangerous Person." However, with Neoliberalism and Globalism going too far, we might need the Left/Socialism to try a bit harder. Everything is balance. Until humanity calms down, the Left/Socialism needs to update and strive to be a balancer against Individualism/Liberalism. Everything is best in moderation, but we tend to polarize. Reconciling Liberty and Equality, Individualism and Collectivism, is maturity. Once, GHQ and the US dreamed of "The Left" (Idealism) and made Japan a testing ground. But facing the "Reality" of the Cold War, they converted (Reverse Course). Now, we are dreaming the "New Left Dream" of PC and Environmentalism. Will this too fade before "Reality"? Or will we go as far as Ota Ryu and "Reptilians"? Either way, perhaps only "Cold Reality" (Boring Daily Life) can stop the runaway "Sincere Heart" (Justice).